Obergefell's Liberties: All in the Family by Appleton, Susan Frelich
Obergefell’s Liberties: All in the Family 
SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON 
This Article, part of a colloquium on the Supreme Court’s 2015 case 
Obergefell v. Hodges, which guaranteed a right of same-sex couples 
to marry, makes two principal contributions to our understanding of 
constitutional “liberty,” both with significance for family law. The 
first contribution is analytic. This Article joins the debate among the 
Obergefell Justices, including the four dissenters, about whether 
Fourteenth Amendment liberty only protects against interference by 
the state or whether it can also compel affirmative support or 
government action. On close inspection, this debate not only obscures 
complexities that defy a clear-cut binary but also camouflages diverse 
conceptions of liberty found in the majority opinion itself. Analysis of 
four different readings of “liberty” in Obergefell’s majority opinion 
reveals that marriage—the substantive issue in the case—and its 
distinctive features account for much of this messiness and 
multiplicity.  
 
This Article also makes a theoretical contribution by exploring the 
relationship between constitutional law and family law that the 
Court’s liberty rulings have forged. The usual approach emphasizes 
the impact of constitutional doctrine on family law, specifically how 
the Court’s liberty rulings have required substantive changes in laws 
governing the family. By contrast, this Article turns to the unexamined 
mirror image, exposing and theorizing how family law principles, 
assumptions, and values have infiltrated and shaped constitutional 
doctrine, including doctrine disputed in Obergefell. A survey of the 
constitutional case law limiting obligations owed by the state reveals 
that these precedents are “all in the family,” in the sense that they all 
raise issues of concern to family law. These cases, along with those 
applying the Constitution to expand access to marriage and divorce, 
suggest the influence of family law’s policy of identifying private 
sources of support for dependent members of society. Had the 
Obergefell majority explicitly acknowledged and embraced this family 
law policy in recognizing a constitutional right to marry for same-sex 
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couples, it could have avoided some of the criticism and confusion that 
the opinion has sparked. 
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“The right of same-sex couples to marry . . . is part of the liberty promised by 
the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”1 
                                                                                                                     
 1 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Family law and constitutional law stand firmly joined at the hip. A 
principal ingredient now binding these two domains is “the liberty promised 
by the Fourteenth Amendment,” the basis for the Supreme Court’s storied 
ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges, which guaranteed access to marriage for same-
sex couples nationwide.2 Obergefell stands out as one of the most recent 
illustrations of the Court’s repeated reliance on liberty since the 1920s to 
review state regulation of family life.3 Over the years, the Court’s liberty 
rulings have come to protect childrearing decisions,4 reproductive choices,5 
sexual activities,6 and intimate relationships, including those officially 
recognized and some created privately and informally.7 
This application of liberty to family matters has not developed free from 
controversy. Especially in recent years, forceful dissents have accompanied the 
                                                                                                                     
 2 Id. The U.S. Supreme Court has also applied the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause to overturn discrimination based on gender, “illegitimacy,” and marital 
status, creating another intersection of family law and constitutional law. I have explored 
such developments elsewhere. See Susan Frelich Appleton, The Forgotten Family Law of 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 28 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 1–9 (2016) [hereinafter Appleton, 
Forgotten Family Law]; Susan Frelich Appleton, Gender and Parentage: Family Law’s 
Equality Project in Our Empirical Age, in WHAT IS PARENTHOOD? CONTEMPORARY 
DEBATES ABOUT THE FAMILY 237, 240–42 (Linda C. McClain & Daniel Cere eds., 2013); 
Susan Frelich Appleton, Illegitimacy and Sex, Old and New, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 347, 354–60 (2012) [hereinafter Appleton, Illegitimacy and Sex]; Susan Frelich 
Appleton, Missing in Action? Searching for Gender Talk in the Same-Sex Marriage 
Debate, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 97, 110–20 (2005) [hereinafter Appleton, Missing in 
Action?]. 
 3 Obergefell’s status as the most recent of such rulings was eclipsed a year later by 
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309–18 (2016), which clarified 
the standard of review applicable to abortion restrictions and struck down two measures 
enacted by Texas. 
 4 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Troxel v. 
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–67 (2000) (plurality opinion).  
 5 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (invoking right of 
privacy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453–55 (1972) (same); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113, 153 (1973) (locating privacy right in Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty); 
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851–52 (1992) (plurality opinion) 
(explaining how liberty protects personal decisions like abortion); Whole Woman’s Health, 
136 S. Ct. at 2309 (applying heightened scrutiny to regulation of abortion, “a 
constitutionally protected personal liberty”). 
 6 See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453–55; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 7 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); 
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501–06 (1977) (plurality opinion); 
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383–84 (1978); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574; United 
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692–93 (2013). 
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opinions for the Court,8 voicing an array of disagreements, often in 
particularly provocative terms. For example, in Obergefell Justice Alito 
condemned the majority for giving liberty “a distinctively postmodern 
meaning”9—a dig about uncertain meanings that itself evokes multiple 
interpretations.10 Three other members of the Obergefell Court also issued 
dissenting opinions contesting the majority’s use of liberty.11 
This Article on Obergefell makes two principal contributions to our 
understanding of constitutional “liberty,” both with significance for family 
law. The first contribution is analytic. This Article joins the debate among the 
Obergefell Justices, including the four dissenters, about whether Fourteenth 
Amendment liberty only protects against interference by the state or whether it 
can also compel affirmative support or government action. On close 
inspection, this debate—mired in longstanding efforts to maintain distinctions 
between negative/positive, private/public, and natural/legally constructed—
obscures complexities that defy a clear-cut binary. Indeed, careful reading and 
analysis uncover diverse conceptions of liberty not only when comparing the 
Obergefell majority opinion to the dissents but also within the majority 
opinion itself. Marriage, the substantive issue in Obergefell, and its distinctive 
features account for much of this messiness and multiplicity.  
This Article also makes a theoretical contribution by exploring the 
relationship between constitutional law and family law that the Court’s liberty 
rulings have forged. The usual approach emphasizes the impact of 
constitutional doctrine on family law, specifically how the Court’s liberty 
rulings have required substantive changes in laws governing the family and 
have challenged the abiding claim that this realm belongs to the states.12 By 
contrast, this Article turns to the unexamined mirror image, exposing and 
theorizing how family law principles, assumptions, and values have infiltrated 
and shaped constitutional doctrine, including doctrine disputed in Obergefell. 
Again, marriage and its peculiar properties play a central role in this 
investigation, which ultimately leads to a focus on the policy of identifying 
private sources of support for dependent members of society. 
                                                                                                                     
 8 To list just a few recent examples, the Court produced no majority opinion on most 
of the issues presented in Casey, 505 U.S. at 843–44, and Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60; three 
Justices dissented in Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586, 605; and four did so in both Windsor, 133 
S. Ct. at 2696, 2697, 2711, and Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611, 2626, 2631, 
2640 (2015). Three of the eight Justices deciding the case dissented in Whole Woman’s 
Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2321, 2330. 
 9 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2640 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 10 See infra notes 187–200, 286–300 and accompanying text.  
 11 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2616–23 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting, joined by Scalia 
and Thomas, JJ.); id. at 2627–30 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Thomas, J.); id. at 2631–
40 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J.). 
 12 For the traditional claim that family law is state law, see, e.g., Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 
at 2689–92. But see JILL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED 17–20 (2014) 
(rejecting as a myth the “canonical story” that family law is local). 
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Part II of this Article introduces Obergefell, first setting out the Court’s 
choice of a ruling mainly grounded in liberty rather than equality and then 
noting the important divisions among the Justices that this particular choice 
provoked.13 Part III contextualizes these divisions, with Part III.A presenting 
the distinction assumed by the dissenters and Part III.B providing background 
from selected precedents to explain their challenges to the majority’s reliance 
on liberty. Part III.C takes a closer look at the majority opinion in Obergefell, 
invoking the frameworks that the Court has traditionally followed to identify 
four readings of Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion, each based on a different 
conception of liberty. Part IV adopts a wider lens. Part IV.A considers the 
implications of the assorted liberties identified in the foregoing analysis, 
examining both the promise and the limits of each reading while showing why 
such insights fail to yield meaningful forecasts of doctrinal developments to 
come. Part IV.B illuminates the dynamic relationship between family law and 
constitutional law, looking beyond the ways constitutional rulings have 
affected family law to hypothesize, through patterns in the case law, the ways 
that family law might well have guided constitutional law. These patterns help 
make sense of the tension in Obergefell about negative versus positive liberty 
(or private versus public rights) by establishing that the critical constitutional 
precedents are all family law cases—or “all in the family.” In turn, these 
patterns afford purchase for thinking about the future in a different way, based 
on family law’s core—albeit contested—policy of maintaining dependency as 
a private responsibility. The Conclusion speculates, consistent with this policy, 
that the Court might continue to rely on liberty to expand required recognition 
of personal relationships, notwithstanding Obergefell’s exaltation of marriage.  
II. OBERGEFELL AND ITS DIVIDED FOUNDATIONS 
In Obergefell, a fractured Supreme Court resolved a circuit split about 
whether states can exclude same-sex couples from their marriage regimes.14 In 
doing so, the Court confronted other divisions, most notably to what extent to 
rely on due process versus equal protection and how to interpret the 
constitutional prohibition on “State depriv[ations] . . . 
of . . . liberty . . . without due process of law.”15 The following Parts examine 
these underlying fissures. 
                                                                                                                     
 13 In emphasizing the Justices’ specific disagreements about liberty, I do not suggest 
that an equality-based rationale would have produced unanimity. In fact, I feel confident 
that, no matter what the ground the majority might have used to strike down bans against 
marriage for same-sex couples, the four Justices in the minority still would have dissented. 
See Louis Michael Seidman, The Triumph of Gay Marriage and the Failure of 
Constitutional Law, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 117–30 (critiquing the various ways in which 
the dissenters invoke constitutional limits to support their preferred outcome). 
 14 The Court split 5–4. See supra notes 9, 11 and accompanying text. 
 15 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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A. From Marriage Equality to Marriage Liberty 
By the time the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the cases that became 
Obergefell v. Hodges,16 the social movement challenging traditional 
heteronormative marriage laws had undergone both a conceptual and a 
terminological evolution. Michael Boucai has called attention to the radical 
impulses animating the initial cases of the 1970s, in which he has found 
evidence of litigants’ efforts to advance sexual liberty and queer culture and to 
disrupt the very idea of marriage.17 In the ensuing years, however, gay rights 
advocacy pursued a more assimilationist strategy, making “like-straight”18 
arguments against discriminatory laws and relying on narratives to “highlight 
the similarities between the human qualities inherent in childrearing in stable 
marriage relationships and the comparable human qualities—such as 
‘friendship, play, knowledge’—inherent in stable homosexual relationships.”19  
As goals and strategies evolved, so too did vocabulary. One-time 
references to “same-sex marriage”20 later often became “gay marriage,” in part 
to emphasize the central role of homophobia in marriage restrictions and other 
discriminatory laws.21 Yet, by the time Obergefell reached the Supreme Court, 
common parlance, at least among the politically sensitive, if not the politically 
correct, exhibited a preference for the term “marriage equality,”22 more often 
                                                                                                                     
 16 In Obergefell, the Court decided cases that came from Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, 
and Tennessee. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593. 
 17 See generally Michael Boucai, Glorious Precedents: When Gay Marriage Was 
Radical, 27 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (2015) (surveying the goals and litigation tactics of 
early same-sex marriage plaintiffs). 
 18 Marc Spindelman, Surviving Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1615, 1619 
(2004). 
 19 Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L. REV. 45, 104 (1996) 
(footnote omitted) (quoting STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, 
AND COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 211 (1990)). Of course, several gay 
rights activists challenged the assimilationist approach. E.g., Nancy D. Polikoff, 
Commentary, We Will Get What We Ask for: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage 
Will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage,” 79 VA. L. REV. 
1535, 1536 (1993) (summarizing opposing positions and contending that “the desire to 
marry in the lesbian and gay community is an attempt to mimic the worst of mainstream 
society, an effort to fit into an inherently problematic institution that betrays the promise of 
both lesbian and gay liberation and radical feminism”). 
 20 See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Introduction: Same-Sex Marriage as a Moving Story, 
16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 2 (2005). 
 21 See, e.g., Edward Stein, Evaluating the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian 
and Gay Rights, 49 UCLA L. REV. 471, 499–502 (2001). 
 22 See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage 
Equality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1235 (2010) (using California litigation as a case study of the 
marriage-equality movement and its effects). 
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even than “freedom to marry,” the name of a prominent advocacy organization 
with a leadership role in the movement.23  
Obergefell’s historic ruling intervenes in both trajectories. First, it marks 
the triumph of the assimilationist approach, shown by the majority opinion’s 
rhetoric about the universality of marriage24 and its stories of the named 
plaintiffs’ shared lives, in sickness and in health and through the difficulties of 
chosen commitments, from parenting to military service.25  
Second, despite the contemporary emphasis on “marriage equality,” 
Obergefell relies on the protection of liberty in the Due Process Clause to 
perform the heavy lifting in the case, relegating the Equal Protection Clause to 
a secondary, supporting role. The Court begins its opinion by explicitly 
identifying liberty as the central issue posed—indeed, using the word three 
times—with only an indirect allusion to equality: 
 The Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that 
includes certain specific rights that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to 
define and express their identity. The petitioners in these cases seek to find 
that liberty by marrying someone of the same sex and having their marriages 
deemed lawful on the same terms and conditions as marriages between 
persons of the opposite sex.26 
The majority goes on to hold, as quoted in this Article’s epigraph, that 
“[t]he right of same-sex couples to marry . . . is part of the liberty promised by 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”27 The opinion devotes over 3,000 words to its 
analysis of liberty, compared to less than half that many to explain the synergy 
between liberty and equality.28 Further, the opinion leaves unaddressed a 
                                                                                                                     
 23 See generally FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/7WEC-LN87].  
 24 E.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015) (“The centrality of 
marriage to the human condition makes it unsurprising that the institution has existed for 
millennia and across civilizations. Since the dawn of history, marriage has transformed 
strangers into relatives, binding families and societies together.”). 
 25 See id. at 2594–95. 
 26 Id. at 2593. 
 27 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 28 After stating why excluding same-sex couples from marriage violates liberty, the 
Court continues:  
 The right of same-sex couples to marry that is part of the liberty promised by the 
Fourteenth Amendment is derived, too, from that Amendment’s guarantee of the equal 
protection of the laws. The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are 
connected in a profound way, though they set forth independent principles.  
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602–03. The Court cites various precedents exemplifying the 
relationship between the two provisions, concluding that “[i]t is now clear that the 
challenged laws burden the liberty of same-sex couples, and it must be further 
acknowledged that they abridge central precepts of equality.” Id. at 2604. Further, in 
discussing equality, the Court makes a point of mentioning, albeit briefly, how marriage 
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number of important questions that an application of the Equal Protection 
Clause might well have elicited, including whether the problematic 
classification rests on gender29 or sexual-orientation and what standard of 
review governs sexual-orientation discrimination.30 
The four dissenting opinions voice an array of objections. In one 
prominent refrain that echoes the “[w]ho decides?” approach used below by 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,31 the dissents decry the 
majority’s judicial usurpation of a legislative or political matter.32 Another 
recurring theme sounds an alarm about the threat to religious liberty posed by 
the ruling.33 For purposes of this Article, however, the most salient difference 
between the majority and each of the dissents can be found in the multiple 
understandings of liberty that emerge. 
B. Contested Liberty 
Justice Alito’s Obergefell dissent pointedly raises one familiar controversy 
about liberty: the term’s uncertain content. According to Justice Alito:  
The Constitution says nothing about a right to same-sex marriage, but the 
Court holds that the term “liberty” in the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment encompasses this right. Our Nation was founded 
upon the principle that every person has the unalienable right to liberty, but 
liberty is a term of many meanings. For classical liberals, it may include 
economic rights now limited by government regulation. For social democrats, 
it may include the right to a variety of government benefits. For today’s 
majority, it has a distinctively postmodern meaning.34 
In a subsequent interview, Justice Alito elaborated, explaining that the 
majority’s notion of liberty is “the freedom to define your understanding of the 
meaning of life. Your—it’s the right to self-expression. So if all of this is on 
the table now, where are the legal limits on it?”35  
                                                                                                                     
has changed, given the invalidation of “invidious sex-based classifications” historically 
marking the institution. Id. at 2603. 
 29 See Mary Anne Case, Missing Sex Talk in the Supreme Court’s Same-Sex Marriage 
Cases, 84 UMKC L. REV. 675, 675, 677 (2016). 
 30 See Peter Nicolas, Obergefell’s Squandered Potential, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 137, 
138 (2015). 
 31 DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 395–96 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 32 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2611–12, 2626 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2627 
(Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 2642 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 33 Id. at 2625–26 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2638–39 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 34 Id. at 2640 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 35 Russell Berman, Samuel Alito and the Slippery Slope of Liberty, ATLANTIC (July 
21, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/samuel-alito-supreme-court-
gay-marriage-ruling-liberty/399008/ [https://perma.cc/C3RJ-8EW5] (quoting Justice Samuel 
Alito in an interview with Bill Kristol).  
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This critique captures longstanding pushback against judicial rulings that 
purportedly “invent” new constitutional rights based on value judgments or 
popular opinion,36 with “judicial activism” as an oft-used, if imprecise, 
shorthand among opponents of such jurisprudence.37 A famous variation on 
this theme appears in Justice Scalia’s dissent in Lawrence v. Texas, where he 
attacked the Court’s evocative but elusive definition of liberty borrowed from 
an earlier abortion case—“At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s 
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of 
human life.”—and dismissively dubbed it the “sweet-mystery-of-life 
passage.”38 At bottom, for Justice Alito in Obergefell, just as for Justice Scalia 
before him in Lawrence, “liberty,” as used by the majority, has different 
meanings for different people even when it comes to intimate life and family 
matters, so this crucial term could encompass anything and everything.39  
This critique is neither novel nor unexpected. Indeed, from its earliest 
applications of the Due Process Clause to family and personal matters, the 
Court itself has conceded such indeterminacy, confessing a reluctance to 
define “liberty” with “exactness”—even while providing at least a partial list 
                                                                                                                     
 36 See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2328–30 (2016) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507–26 (1965) (Black, J., 
dissenting); John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 
YALE L.J. 920, 935–49 (1973).  
 37 See, e.g., Craig Green, An Intellectual History of Judicial Activism, 58 EMORY L.J. 
1195, 1217–20 (2009). 
 38 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574, 588 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (first 
quoting and then citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) 
(plurality opinion)). 
 39 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. Chief Justice Roberts echoes this 
criticism in his Obergefell dissent, recalling the infamous precedents of Lochner v. New 
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2612, 2616–17 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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of included elements.40 If constitutional liberty is to have some substantive 
content, who else but the Justices would have the burden of supplying it?41  
I bracket this general and frequently noted problem to focus on a more 
particularized, and ultimately more productive, difficulty centered on the 
meaning of “liberty” in Obergefell. The dissents of Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Thomas articulate this difficulty most explicitly. The former challenges 
the majority for erroneously “convert[ing] the shield provided by 
constitutional liberties into a sword to demand positive entitlements from the 
State.”42 Echoing this objection, Justice Thomas claims that the majority 
departs from the established understanding of liberty “as freedom from 
government action, not entitlement to government benefits.”43 The two other 
dissents (by Justices Scalia and Alito) appear to agree, while making the point 
less directly.44  
                                                                                                                     
 40 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (“While this Court has not 
attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much 
consideration and some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, 
it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to 
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, 
to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates 
of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common 
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”); see also Eisenstadt v. 
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of 
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into 
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a 
child.”); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Due process 
has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined by reference to any 
code.”). For judicial efforts over the years to formulate “tests” for applying liberty, 
compared to Obergefell’s approach, see Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147, 168–69 (2015).  
 41 Of course, some of the Justices have tried to eschew substantive due process 
altogether, reading the clause to afford only procedural protections. See Obergefell, 135 
S. Ct. at 2631–32 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 42 Id. at 2620 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); cf. Kari E. Hong, Obergefell’s Sword: The 
Liberal State Interest in Marriage, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1439 (contending that state 
intervention in the name of liberty and privacy can serve as a powerful tool to obtain 
benefits and protections); Catherine Powell, Up from Marriage: Freedom, Solitude, and 
Individual Autonomy in the Shadow of Marriage Equality, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 69, 72 
(2015) (contending that Obergefell “conflates, on the one hand, the negative duty of the 
state not to interfere in individual rights to exercise the freedom to marry (or not), and, on 
the other hand, any positive obligation of the state to support affirmatively individual rights 
to marry and the institution of marriage”). For an entirely different take on this language in 
the Chief Justice’s dissent, see Marc Spindelman, Obergefell’s Dreams, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1039 (2016). 
 43 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2631 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 44 See id. at 2630 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“What possible ‘essence’ does substantive 
due process ‘capture’ in an ‘accurate and comprehensive way’? It stands for nothing 
whatever, except those freedoms and entitlements that this Court really likes.”); id. at 2640 
(Alito, J., dissenting) (“For social democrats, [liberty] may include the right to a variety of 
government benefits.”). 
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The binary animating the Obergefell dissents has tenacious roots. First, the 
dissents’ limited conception of liberty, as exclusively a barrier against state 
interference, recalls family law’s well-worn public/private divide, which has a 
long history, from the separate-spheres era45 to more recent feminist critiques 
debunking this dichotomy as altogether illusory.46 Under the traditional 
formulation, there is a “private realm of family life which the state cannot 
enter;”47 this sphere exists apart from the market and the state (both deemed 
public);48 and this private sphere belongs to women.49 Yet, one powerful 
feminist attack shows how the state is inextricably part of the private sphere 
simply by “determin[ing] what counts as private and what forms of intimacy 
are entitled to public recognition.”50 Other critics emphasize that family law 
has both private and public dimensions, with middle and upper class families 
enjoying the former’s deference to family decisionmaking51 and poor families 
subjected to the latter’s routine disrespect,52 including oppression by the child 
welfare system.53 
Second, we can connect the divide asserted by the Obergefell dissents with 
efforts in constitutional jurisprudence to distinguish “negative rights” from 
“positive rights,” with the former encompassing only freedom from state 
interference and the latter referring to guarantees of affirmative support from 
the state.54 Again, critical analysis has exposed the distinction as specious, 
given the state’s role in creating the “natural” or the “status quo”55 and the 
                                                                                                                     
 45 See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring). 
 46 E.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Feminism and the State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1181, 1187 
(1994); see also Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L. 
REV. 1, 10–43 (1992) (reviewing and critiquing feminist critiques of the public/private 
distinction). 
 47 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
 48 Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal 
Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1501 (1983). 
 49 See id. 
 50 See Rhode, supra note 46, at 1187; see also MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE 
STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND AMERICA’S POLITICAL IDEALS 54 (2010) (“At the 
most basic level, the very determination of whether a particular group of citizens 
constitutes a family is determined by state action.”); Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State 
Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 835, 836–37 (1985) (explaining why 
nonintervention in the family is an incoherent idea). 
 51 See, e.g., Cynthia Godsoe, Parsing Parenthood, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 113, 
116 (2013). 
 52 See, e.g., Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public Families, 34 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 113, 117 (2011). 
 53 See, e.g., Godsoe, supra note 51, at 116. 
 54 See, e.g., Jenna MacNaughton, Comment, Positive Rights in Constitutional Law: 
No Need to Graft, Best Not to Prune, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 750, 750–51 (2001). 
 55 See Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 
2292–93 (1990); Olsen, supra note 48, at 1506. 
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myriad forms of state support so taken for granted that they have become 
invisible.56 
Although the private/public distinction often surfaces in family law and 
the negative/positive distinction is more familiar in constitutional law, the two 
binaries (contested as they may be) share much in common even if the 
concepts they purport to identify do not match exactly. “Private” suggests a 
realm protected from state interference, similar to the notion of negative 
constitutional rights; by contrast, “public” suggests a realm in which the state 
plays a role, thus overlapping with the claim to state assistance inherent in the 
idea of positive constitutional rights.57 Moreover, both areas have elicited what 
I find to be persuasive critiques that operate principally in one direction, 
expanding what we should consider public and narrowing the private (perhaps 
to nonexistence). That is, these critiques reveal the public features of the 
nominally private realm or the state-constructed aspects of negative rights.58 
Thus, although the two pairs are not entirely interchangeable, they share 
common features emphasized in the analysis that follows. 
III. THE TRADITIONAL FRAMEWORK: DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION 
The negative/positive or private/public distinction that the Obergefell 
dissents assume derives from frameworks that the Court established in earlier 
cases. This Part first sets out key features of these frameworks and their 
development and then shows, based on a close look at the majority opinion, 
how they explain—and also how they fail to explain—the tension in 
Obergefell. 
A. Private Liberty and Public Marriage 
The “conventional wisdom,” as Susan Bandes has called it, depicts 
constitutional liberty as a negative right or protection from active state 
                                                                                                                     
 56 See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF 
DEPENDENCY 32–33 (2004). See generally Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a 
Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923) (revealing coercive restrictions 
imposed by law even within a laissez-faire regime). For a different repudiation of the 
distinction between positive and negative rights, see HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: 
SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 30, 35–64 (2d ed. 1996), which 
posits that security and subsistence are basic rights necessary for the enjoyment of other 
rights.  
 57 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. Isaiah Berlin’s notion of “‘negative’ 
freedom” tracks the conception of negative liberty or negative rights followed in 
constitutional law, although Berlin’s notion of “positive freedom” differs from the 
constitutional law counterpart. See ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 122–34 
(1969). 
 58 See supra notes 50–53, 55–56 and accompanying text; cf. Gavison, supra note 46, 
at 14–21. 
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interference.59 According to some accounts, this understanding derives from 
the language of the Fourteenth Amendment, which says that no state 
“shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law.”60 The Court has found such deprivations of liberty in laws restricting 
sex, reproduction, and childrearing, calling these activities “private” and thus 
signaling that they take place outside the public sphere and purportedly require 
no state action for individuals to undertake.61 Indeed, over the years liberty 
and privacy became connected in this line of cases, which initially used the 
language of “liberty,”62 then invoked a “right of privacy,”63 later explained 
that the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty in the Due Process 
Clause provides the constitutional source for this right of privacy,64 and 
ultimately abandoned the “privacy” terminology altogether in favor of 
exclusive reliance on “liberty.”65 Interpreted against this background, liberty 
limits government intrusion in private domains, but it does not compel 
government to do anything. 
This notion of liberty under the U.S. Constitution contrasts with 
guarantees in other bills of rights. For example, the “right to life” protected by 
Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights entails a government 
duty to prevent foreseeable loss of life in some circumstances.66 Similarly, the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) includes 
several rights that assume affirmative support from the state, such as Article 6, 
which provides: “States Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent possible 
the survival and development of the child,”67 and Article 7, which provides: 
“The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right 
from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and, as far as possible, 
                                                                                                                     
 59 Bandes, supra note 55, at 2273. 
 60 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 38 (1973); Susan Frelich Appleton, Beyond the Limits of 
Reproductive Choice: The Contributions of the Abortion-Funding Cases to Fundamental-
Rights Analysis and to the Welfare-Rights Thesis, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 721, 733, 747 
(1981); Bandes, supra note 55, at 2310. 
 61 E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 
153 (1973); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); cf. Cary Franklin, 
Griswold and the Public Dimension of the Right to Privacy, 124 YALE L.J. F. 332, 333–35 
(2015) (theorizing Griswold as an anti-poverty case, given the access to contraception 
clinics that it protected). 
 62 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
 63 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965). 
 64 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. 
 65 Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, 
2002–2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21, 33–34 (noting the switch from “privacy” to “liberty” in 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence). 
 66 See ROBIN C.A. WHITE & CLARE OVEY, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS 152–56 (5th ed. 2010) (describing this provision as imposing “the positive 
obligation to protect life”). 
 67 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 6, § 2, Nov. 20, 1989, 
1577 U.N.T.S. 3.  
932 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 77:5 
the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.”68 Indeed, the 
UNCRC’s protection of such positive rights might well help explain why the 
United States remains one of only a handful of countries refusing to adopt this 
convention.69  
On its face, a constitutional right to marry looks more akin to these 
guarantees recognized in other countries than to the ordinarily private 
conceptualization of liberty in the United States. Civil marriage requires active 
participation of the state. The state issues marriage licenses, recognizes 
couples as married after they have complied with applicable legal regulations, 
and provides a host of legal benefits based on the status of marriage.70 Indeed, 
Nelson Tebbe and Deborah Widiss call civil marriage “a government 
program.”71 Civil marriage takes a couple’s personal relationship and makes it 
official, adding the state itself as a third “partner[].”72 So, even if the 
                                                                                                                     
 68 Id. art. 7, § 1. Article 7 goes on to say: “States Parties shall ensure the 
implementation of these rights in accordance with their national law and their obligations 
under the relevant international instruments in this field, in particular where the child 
would otherwise be stateless.” Id. art. 7, § 2. 
 69 See Susan Frelich Appleton, Restating Childhood, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 525, 541–42 
(2014). 
 70 See, e.g., NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING 
ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 123 (2008). Courts in marriage-equality cases routinely 
cite the many legal consequences that accompany marital status. See, e.g., Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015) (noting that the “expanding list of governmental 
rights, benefits, and responsibilities” tied to “marital status include: taxation; inheritance 
and property rights; rules of intestate succession; spousal privilege in the law of evidence; 
hospital access; medical decisionmaking authority; adoption rights; the rights and benefits 
of survivors; birth and death certificates; professional ethics rules; campaign finance 
restrictions; workers’ compensation benefits; health insurance; and child custody, support, 
and visitation rules”); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013) (“Among the 
over 1,000 statutes and numerous federal regulations that DOMA controls are laws 
pertaining to Social Security, housing, taxes, criminal sanctions, copyright, and veterans’ 
benefits.”); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 902 n.28 (Iowa 2009) (“Plaintiffs identify 
over two hundred Iowa statutes affected by civil-marriage status.”); Goodridge v. Dep’t of 
Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955–56 (Mass. 2003) (noting that “hundreds of statutes are 
related to marriage and to marital benefits” and listing examples (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 71 Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1375, 1378 (2010) (“[C]ivil marriage is a government program that provides 
certain benefits and imposes certain obligations.”). See generally Gregg Strauss, The 
Positive Right to Marry, 102 VA. L. REV. 1691 (2016).  
 72 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 954 (“In a real sense, there are three partners to every 
civil marriage: two willing spouses and an approving State.”); cf. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 
2635 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Petitioners do not ask this Court to order the States to stop 
restricting their ability to enter same-sex relationships, to engage in intimate behavior, to 
make vows to their partners in public ceremonies, to engage in religious wedding 
ceremonies, to hold themselves out as married, or to raise children. The States have 
imposed no such restrictions. . . . Instead, the States have refused to grant them 
governmental entitlements.”). 
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distinction between public and private is fuzzy and uncertain, marriage has 
many attributes that should place it on the public side of the line. 
Family law’s famous “channeling function”73 helps explain why the state 
would make the policy decision to offer material marital benefits when 
nothing in the Constitution compels such privileged treatment: By rewarding 
marriage, the state incentivizes individuals to choose this official format for 
their sexual and intimate relationships, in turn providing a structure that 
assigns care and support duties to family members and manages consequences 
upon dissolution, relieving the state from the need to meet resulting 
dependencies.74 Some theorists conceptualize privatizing dependency as 
family law’s animating purpose.75 Indeed, the state’s very interest in imposing 
private obligations and its control of marriage to advance this interest bolster 
the Obergefell dissenters’ position that marriage is public, not private. 
Considerable authority reinforces this conclusion, with classic statements in 
past cases asserting that marriage results from “public ordination”76 and 
describing marriage as “a great public institution.”77 The Obergefell majority 
quotes with approval this latter observation.78 
In short, the contrasting roles of the state in private family matters and in 
public marriage undergird the Obergefell dissenters’ claims that the majority 
improperly invoked liberty to overturn laws that limit marriage to cross-sex 
couples. As the dissenters see it, to say that same-sex couples have a right to 
marry compels state action, erroneously making liberty “a sword”79 and 
improperly conferring “entitlements.”80  
B. The Demise of the Welfare-Rights Thesis 
The distinction that the Obergefell dissenters assume is not as clear-cut as 
they suggest, however. First, Obergefell is not the first “right to marry” case in 
which the Court relied, at least in part, on liberty. Notable predecessors 
                                                                                                                     
 73 See Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 495, 523 (1992); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 243–66 (1992); 
Linda C. McClain, Love, Marriage, and the Baby Carriage: Revisiting the Channelling 
Function of Family Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2133, 2133 (2007). 
 74 See, e.g., Laura A. Rosenbury, Federal Visions of Private Family Support, 67 
VAND. L. REV. 1835, 1866–67 (2014). 
 75 See, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 56, at 44, 108–09, 208; see also Nancy Fraser & 
Linda Gordon, A Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a Keyword of the U.S. Welfare State, 
19 SIGNS 309, 311 (1994) (arguing that “dependency” is “an ideological term” carrying 
“strong emotive and visual associations and a powerful pejorative charge”). 
 76 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 213 (1888) (quoting Noel v. Ewing, 9 Ind. 37, 50 
(1857)).  
 77 Id. (quoting Noel, 9 Ind. at 50).  
 78 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015) (quoting Maynard, 125 U.S. at 
211). 
 79 Id. at 2620 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 80 Id.; see also id. at 2631 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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include Loving v. Virginia, holding unconstitutional anti-miscegenation laws,81 
and Zablocki v. Redhail, invalidating obstacles to marriage imposed on 
prospective spouses with outstanding support obligations.82 If marriage is 
public but liberty protects only negative or private rights, how would we 
explain these earlier cases? They go beyond keeping the state out of one’s 
personal choice of an intimate or sexual partner, by affording access to civil 
marriage and its state-conferred consequences based on such choice.83 
Second, until the 1970s or so, Supreme Court opinions protecting 
individual interests under the Fourteenth Amendment reflected sufficient 
ambiguity to invite speculation about the possible recognition of a 
constitutional right to minimum welfare or “minimum protection”84—a right 
to have subsistence and other basic needs met even when active state support 
would be necessary to realize this right.85 Cases ensuring access to counsel 
and a transcript in a criminal appeal,86 mandating procedural safeguards before 
the denial of welfare benefits,87 and requiring for new arrivals in the state 
public assistance like that provided to long-term residents88 all suggested 
that—at least in some situations—the Constitution might confer affirmative 
entitlements from the state.89 This welfare-rights thesis was strengthened by 
case law of the era developing or affirming doctrines of unconstitutional 
conditions,90 irrebuttable presumptions,91 and public fora,92 all of which 
assumed a role for the state in the protection of constitutional liberties. Still, 
additional blurring of sharp lines between public and private arose from 
                                                                                                                     
 81 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967). 
 82 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383, 388–91 (1978). 
 83 Before Loving, the Court had invalidated under the Equal Protection Clause anti-
miscegenation laws that criminalized sex and cohabitation between unmarried interracial 
couples. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 184 (1964). 
 84 See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term—Foreword: On 
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 9–10, 35 
(1969). In this article, Michelman based his analysis on cases decided under the Equal 
Protection Clause. Id. at 10. 
 85 See Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 
WASH. U. L.Q. 659, 663 (noting cases both supporting and contradicting the welfare-rights 
thesis). See generally CARL WELLMAN, WELFARE RIGHTS (1982) (exploring various 
conceptions of welfare rights). 
 86 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355–58 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 
12, 17–19 (1956). 
 87 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261–64 (1970). 
 88 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969), overruled in part by Edelman v. 
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
 89 See Michelman, supra note 84, at 12–13. 
 90 E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404–06 (1963); see Kathleen M. Sullivan, 
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1428–42 (1989). 
 91 E.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 647–51 (1974); see Deborah 
Dinner, Recovering the LaFleur Doctrine, 22 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 343, 392–93 (2010). 
 92 E.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460–63 (1980); see Harry Kalven, Jr., The 
Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 10–21. 
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precedents that embraced a generous notion of the state action required for a 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment93 and arguments of the day that would 
look beyond de jure school segregation to require constitutional remedies for 
de facto segregation as well.94 
Nonetheless, the welfare-rights thesis remained just that: a thesis. It arose 
from inferences based on case outcomes, rather than a definitive articulation 
by the Court95 during an era that also produced rulings that could be read to 
undermine the thesis.96 We might see the process of developing this thesis as 
one resembling the legal-realist approach in which “decisions fall into patterns 
correlated with the underlying factual scenarios of the disputes” (rather than 
according to “the existing legal rules”).97  
Although I consider a more comprehensive list of such cases later,98 at this 
juncture I use just a few selections to recount how the Court settled the 
ambiguity, in turn providing traction for the conventional wisdom about a 
strictly “negative Constitution”99 that drives the claims of the Obergefell 
dissents. In my examination of the Court’s opinions, the demise of the welfare 
rights thesis came in three key phases: two sets of abortion-funding cases, one 
from 1977100 and another from 1980,101 and—for anyone who failed to grasp 
their message or dismissed these cases as simply reflections of abortion 
exceptionalism102—a reinforcement thereof in a 1989 decision about child 
                                                                                                                     
 93 E.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 375–81 (1967); see Terri Peretti, 
Constructing the State Action Doctrine, 1940–1990, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 273, 275–79 
(2010).  
 94 For discussion of such arguments, see Frank I. Goodman, De Facto School 
Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 275, 298–374 
(1972). 
 95 See Michelman, supra note 85, at 662–64; see also Michelman, supra note 84, at 
10. 
 96 E.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141–43 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 
U.S. 471, 483–87 (1970). For discussion of these and other cases, see infra notes 360–405 
and accompanying text. 
 97 Brian Leiter, Legal Realism and Legal Positivism Reconsidered, 111 ETHICS 278, 
281 (2001). For example, Brainerd Currie followed this school of thought in presenting 
governmental interests analysis as a choice of law theory. See BRAINERD CURRIE, Survival 
of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, in SELECTED ESSAYS 
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 128, 132–40 (1963). 
 98 See infra notes 360–405 and accompanying text.  
 99 See Bandes, supra note 55, at 2273–78. 
 100 See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Poelker 
v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977). 
 101 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980). 
 102 Objections to abortion invoked as a reason not to provide government support (via 
the enduring “Hyde Amendment”) or to avoid other types of “complicity” with the 
provision of such services have become an abiding feature of the legislative and judicial 
landscape. See Nicole Huberfeld, Conditional Spending and Compulsory Maternity, 2010 
U. ILL. L. REV. 751, 768–81; Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: 
Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2518–
21 (2015).  
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abuse.103 The following summary details why these precedents prove so 
important.  
Four years after the Court had held, in Roe v. Wade, that the Due Process 
Clause protects a liberty-grounded right to privacy, which includes the right to 
decide whether to terminate a pregnancy within certain time limits,104 the 
Court rejected the argument that the Constitution requires government 
subsidies for women too poor to exercise the abortion right independently—
even when the government in question is putting its financial thumb on the 
scale by subsidizing prenatal care and childbirth for such women.105 Although 
the criminal abortion prohibitions challenged in Roe evoked strict scrutiny 
because they infringed a right that the Court deemed fundamental, the 
selective funding scheme required only rational basis review, which the Court 
deemed satisfied by a state’s value judgment favoring childbirth over 
abortion.106 According to the Court, elective abortion, like other protected 
family liberties, is—in effect—a negative right that state inaction (here failure 
to subsidize) cannot infringe,107 even when the inaction impairs one’s ability 
to exercise the right.108 Put differently, the Court’s reliance on privacy in 
Roe109 foreclosed constitutional claims to public assistance. 
The Court supported its conclusion by invoking other constitutionally 
protected rights rooted in liberty and emphasizing their purely negative 
character. For example, the majority noted that the parental right to choose 
private schooling for one’s children does not entail a right to government-
provided tuition.110 
The 1980 abortion-funding cases explained that this analysis applies even 
to therapeutic abortions.111 In doing so, the Court made clear that an individual 
is not entitled to government assistance even when it is necessary to preserve 
her life or health. The Court categorized both poverty and any dangerous 
health conditions as “natural” situations that the state had not created and thus 
had no constitutional duty to remedy.112 With no fundamental right infringed, 
                                                                                                                     
 103 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
 104 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–54 (1973). 
 105 See Maher, 432 U.S. at 470. 
 106 Id. at 478–79. 
 107 Id. at 475–77. 
 108 Id. at 471–74; see also Appleton, supra note 60, at 733–35. 
 109 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. 
 110 See Maher, 432 U.S. at 476–77 (first citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 
534–35 (1925); and then citing Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 462 (1973)). 
 111 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316–18, 324–25 (1980). Although Congress has 
allowed various exceptions over the years to its ban on abortion funding, such as when a 
pregnancy endangers the woman’s life, the Court’s reasoning makes clear that the 
Constitution does not require any such exceptions. See id. at 316–18. In explaining this 
conclusion, the Court again made the analogy to parental rights to choose private 
schooling, which does not entail a guarantee of subsidized tuition. Id. at 318 (citing Pierce, 
268 U.S. at 510). 
 112 Id. at 316–17. 
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the Court applied rational basis review and again found this standard satisfied 
by an official policy preference for childbirth over abortion.113 
Particularly because of the Court’s repudiation of a right to subsidized 
abortion even when needed for a woman’s survival, these cases sounded a 
death knell for the notion of a constitutional welfare right and thus any more 
general jurisprudence of positive guarantees.114 The abortion-funding cases 
thereby resolved any conflicting signals in earlier opinions,115 rebuffing more 
expansive suggestions about government’s obligations and solidifying more 
miserly approaches.  
The abortion-funding cases’ explicit distinction between negative and 
positive rights reverberated in other doctrinal developments. The abortion-
funding cases contracted the understanding of unconstitutional conditions, 
claiming to limit that principle to situations in which the state “penalizes the 
exercise of [a] right.”116 In the meantime, the Court’s reliance on irrebuttable 
presumptions as means to a conclusion of unconstitutionality collapsed.117 
And although the Court continues to invoke the public forum doctrine,118 
critics interpret its narrowed reach as evidence of its demise.119 Finally, the 
once generous conceptualization of “state action” encountered 
retrenchments,120 consistent with the Court’s rejection of arguments for 
requiring remedies for de facto school segregation.121 
                                                                                                                     
 113 Id. at 324–26. 
 114 See Appleton, supra note 60, at 731–37; see also Susan Frelich Appleton, 
Commentary, Professor Michelman’s Quest for a Constitutional Welfare Right, 1979 
WASH. U. L.Q. 715, 726–29 (noting the challenges that 1977 abortion-funding cases 
present for the welfare-rights thesis). 
 115 See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text. 
 116 See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 n.8 (1977); Sullivan, supra note 90, at 1439–
42. 
 117 See, e.g., Jonathon B. Chase, The Premature Demise of Irrebuttable Presumptions, 
47 U. COLO. L. REV. 653, 653 (1976). 
 118 E.g., Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 
2250 (2015); Christian Legal Soc’y of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 678–83 
(2010). 
 119 See John D. Inazu, The First Amendment’s Public Forum, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1159, 1170–77 (2015). 
 120 E.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838, 840–43 (1982); see Kenneth L. 
Karst, Equal Citizenship at Ground Level: The Consequences of Nonstate Action, 54 DUKE 
L.J. 1591, 1591–92 (2005) (“For a time, academic commentary looked forward to a 
lowering of the state action barrier, but the Supreme Court soon put an end to such 
speculations.” (footnote omitted)); Peretti, supra note 93, at 273–74 (noting the shift from 
the earlier expansive approach, with more recent opinions “signifying a greater reluctance 
on the part of the Court to find state action”); see also Don Herzog, The Kerr Principle, 
State Action, and Legal Rights, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2 (2006) (“[S]tate action is about 
responsibility, not any kind of causation.”). 
 121 See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744–45 (1974); see also Missouri v. 
Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 51 (1990) (emphasizing the importance of placing “the responsibility 
for solutions to the problems of segregation upon those who have themselves created the 
problems”). 
938 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 77:5 
Any lingering possibility that, the abortion-funding cases notwithstanding, 
the Constitution might guarantee support for basic needs evaporated in 1989, 
with the Court’s decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of 
Social Services.122 In DeShaney, the majority determined that the state did not 
violate young Joshua DeShaney’s due process rights when it failed to protect 
him from severe injuries inflicted by his father—even though state child 
welfare officials knew or should have known of risks faced by Joshua and 
returned him to his father’s custody after previously removing him on grounds 
of child abuse.123 Simply put, state inaction cannot be a deprivation of liberty, 
and liberty cannot encompass a right to affirmative protection by the state—
even when the results are life-threatening injuries.124  
DeShaney’s distressing facts included brutal beatings of a four-year-old, 
his potentially fatal coma, and resulting severe brain damage,125 along with the 
previous involvement of child welfare officials. Against that background, the 
Court’s clear rejection of the claim for state protection sent an unmistakable 
message purporting to limit liberty to negative rights, although the abortion-
funding cases had established the same basic principle earlier. More than a 
decade after DeShaney, the Court adhered to the view that the state has no 
affirmative obligation to protect individuals from family violence in a case 
with equally hideous facts—including the death of three children at the hands 
of their father and the police’s inaction despite the mandatory restraining order 
obtained by their mother.126 
I revisit these precedents and consider related cases below.127 For now, 
however, I note that one way to make sense of these precedents turns on the 
verb describing the state’s role, rather than the individual interest at stake.128 
Although the abortion-funding cases and DeShaney put health and life at stake, 
they presented no due process violations because, according to the majorities, 
the state inaction in those cases could not “depriv[e]” a person of liberty or of 
anything else for that matter.129 Under this analysis, embodied in the 
                                                                                                                     
 122 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
 123 Id. at 192–94. 
 124 Id. at 195–97, 201. The Court has acknowledged that states owe affirmative duties 
to those in state custody. See id. at 199–200.  
 125 Id. at 193; Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court and a Life Barely Lived, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 7, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/07/opinion/the-supreme-court-and-
a-life-barely-lived.html [https://perma.cc/4W2P-58KW]. 
 126 See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 751, 754, 766 (2005). 
 127 See infra notes 360–405 and accompanying text.  
 128 See Appleton, supra note 60, at 731–37. 
 129 See Michelman, supra note 84, at 17 (“The due process clause inveighs only 
against certain ‘deprivations’ by the ‘state,’ occurrences which seemingly cannot occur by 
mere default.”). In the abortion-funding cases, the Court drew an apparently bright line 
between state action and inaction and stated that the latter does not constitute the “unduly 
burdensome interference with [a woman’s] freedom to decide whether to terminate her 
pregnancy.” Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314 (1980) (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 
464, 473–74 (1977)). But the Court later abandoned that bright line, transforming the 
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Obergefell dissents, it would follow that the state’s failure to grant to same-sex 
couples a marriage license and the host of material benefits contingent on 
marriage cannot constitute a deprivation of liberty.  
C. Reading Obergefell 
Despite the Obergefell dissenters’ characterization of the majority’s 
improper treatment of the right to marry, the majority opinion in fact lends 
itself to multiple readings, each ascribing a different meaning to the key term 
“liberty.” This Part uses the opinion’s language, reasoning, and citations of 
authority, against the background of the Court’s traditional categorization, to 
examine each of four possible readings, demonstrating within this one case the 
instability and plasticity of the public/private or positive/negative divide. This 
analysis brings to the fore insights about marriage as a unique legal construct 
and thus about family law, marriage’s “home,” more generally. 
1. A Public Liberty Reading of Obergefell 
Let’s begin with the reading of the majority opinion that would concede 
the points made by the dissenters. Under this reading, Justice Kennedy (with 
presumably the other four members of the Court who join him) flatly disagrees 
with the conventional wisdom and the dissenters’ claims to the extent they 
purport to assert a universal rule that the liberty protected by the Due Process 
Clause must necessarily be private—that is, that liberty offers no support for 
claims that require state assistance. If Justice Kennedy rejects the conventional 
wisdom, then we can read his majority opinion to say that constitutionally 
protected liberty includes at least marriage (with the affirmative state action 
that institution contemplates) and perhaps other positive rights as well.  
Six precedents invoked in the majority opinion could support this reading. 
One is Maynard v. Hill, the late nineteenth century divorce-property case cited 
with approval for the description of marriage as “a great public institution.”130 
Four are modern cases relying on the Constitution to compel expanded access 
to marriage or marriage recognition: Loving v. Virginia, striking down 
Virginia’s antimiscegenation law;131 Zablocki v. Redhail, invalidating 
Wisconsin’s obstacles to marriage for those with outstanding support 
                                                                                                                     
language into a test applicable even to active state restrictions on abortion. See Whole 
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 
U.S. 124, 146 (2007); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874–77 
(1992) (plurality opinion); see also Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2321, 2323–25 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (criticizing the abortion-specific standard and its interpretation 
here). 
 130 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 213 (1888) (cited in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 
S. Ct. 2584, 2590, 2601 (2015)). 
 131 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (cited in Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598, 
2599, 2602, 2603, 2604). 
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obligations;132 Turner v. Safley, overturning marriage restrictions for 
inmates;133 and United States v. Windsor, rejecting the gendered definitional 
requirements for federal recognition of marriage in the Defense of Marriage 
Act.134 The sixth precedent used, M.L.B. v. S.J.L., held unconstitutional a 
statute requiring indigent mothers to pay a fee to appeal the termination of 
their parental rights (TPR).135 While Maynard assumes government 
involvement, the others all impose an affirmative obligation on government, 
whether granting a marriage license with all attendant privileges, recognizing 
for purposes of federal benefits a marriage valid under state law, or enabling a 
TPR appeal without cost. 
The approach evident in these cases tracks the analysis in a precedent that 
the Court does not cite. In Boddie v. Connecticut, the Court ruled that due 
process liberty guarantees indigent individuals access to divorce courts 
without paying a required filing fee.136 The Court explained:  
[G]iven the basic position of the marriage relationship in this society’s 
hierarchy of values and the concomitant state monopolization of the means 
for legally dissolving this relationship, due process does prohibit a State from 
denying, solely because of inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals 
who seek judicial dissolution of their marriages.137  
Boddie’s observations transfer well from the divorce context to the context 
of civil marriage, where “the basic position of the marriage relationship in this 
society’s hierarchy of values” merits repeating and the state again wields a 
monopoly—given that civil marriage is attainable only with state 
participation. Divorce and civil marriage are two sides of the same coin, and 
divorce’s public features together with the applicability of Boddie’s language 
to civil marriage strengthen the Obergefell majority’s suggestion of liberty’s 
public dimension, protecting some number of positive rights, contrary to the 
conventional wisdom and the dissenters’ position. 
                                                                                                                     
 132 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (cited in Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 
2598, 2599, 2600, 2602, 2603, 2604). 
 133 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95–96 (1987) (cited in Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 
2598, 2599, 2600, 2602). 
 134 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694–95 (2013) (cited in Obergefell, 
135 S. Ct. at 2597, 2599, 2600, 2601). Windsor strikes down federal legislation, based on 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, in which the Court finds an equal 
protection guarantee. Id. at 2695. 
 135 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120–21 (1996) (cited in Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 
2598, 2603, 2604). 
 136 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971). 
 137 Id. 
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2. Private Liberty Readings of Obergefell 
We can read Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in very different ways, 
however. Under these alternatives, Justice Kennedy (and, again, presumably 
the Justices who join him) might well agree with the dissenters that liberty 
protects only freedom from deprivations by the state or negative rights. 
Certainly, a significant number of precedents invoked by the majority for more 
than a cursory citation, six cases, all fit this classic mold. They all rule 
unconstitutional criminal laws interfering with arguably private or autonomous 
action in matters of sex, reproduction, or childrearing,138 consistent with the 
libertarian approach sometimes associated with Justice Kennedy.139 Put 
differently, these particular liberty cases all exemplify negative rights that 
form the conventional wisdom and provide common ground for the majority 
Justices and dissenters, notwithstanding their disagreements about which 
particular freedoms ought to be so recognized140 and notwithstanding 
scholarly insights about the often overlooked public aspects of such private 
rights.141 
a. Naturalizing Marriage 
Under one reading, Justice Kennedy embraces the conventional wisdom, 
but includes marriage within the constellation of negative rights. That is, his 
opinion lends itself to an interpretation relying on a concept of liberty that, like 
the one articulated by the dissenters, is quintessentially private, not public, 
despite the “great public institution” quotation from Maynard v. Hill.142 Some 
                                                                                                                     
 138 The following cases make up this group: Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 
(2003) (invalidating criminal same-sex sodomy statute); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 
453–55 (1972) (invalidating prohibition on distribution of contraceptives to unmarried 
persons); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (invalidating prohibition 
on the use of contraception, even by married couples); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 
538, 541 (1942) (invalidating law imposing sterilization as punishment for certain crimes); 
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–36 (1925) (invalidating law restricting 
parental choice of private, instead of public, school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 
399–403 (1923) (invalidating law prohibiting the teaching of German to children). 
 139 See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 65, at 33–37. 
 140 For example, although he would agree that liberty, as applied in Lawrence v. Texas, 
protected a negative right, Justice Thomas dissented in that case. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 
605–06; see also supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. 
 141 See, e.g., Franklin, supra note 61, at 336–37 (highlighting the public features of 
Griswold’s right to privacy); Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Loving Lawrence, 102 MICH. L. 
REV. 1447, 1450–58 (2004) (arguing that Lawrence, by invalidating the gay sodomy ban, 
confers respect). 
 142 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015) (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 
U.S. 190, 213 (1888)). 
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scholars espouse this position, treating the right to marry as a “negative 
liberty” and failing to acknowledge the state’s active role.143 
Justice Kennedy invites this reading with rhetoric that naturalizes marriage 
by describing it as an inevitable practice among all humans from the beginning 
of time. For example, in Obergefell Justice Kennedy describes marriage as an 
“institution [that] has existed for millennia and across civilizations,”144 a 
“timeless institution,”145 and “one of civilization’s oldest institutions”146 that 
is “central[] . . . to the human condition”147 and “always has promised nobility 
and dignity to all persons, without regard to their station in life.”148 
This rhetoric situates marriage in human nature, making the state’s role 
invisible. Under this reading, Justice Kennedy’s opinion sees marriage as 
something people instinctively do and have always done.149 In other words, 
while Loving’s brief invocation of liberty emphasized “the freedom of choice 
to marry,”150 in Obergefell the focus becomes the marital status or relationship 
itself, with all its “natural” obligations and benefits. According to this view, 
the marital union predates the state and exists independently of the state, even 
if contemporary marriage practices accord the state a role.  
                                                                                                                     
 143 Anne Alstott takes this position, writing that “[e]very major constitutional right in 
family law that has been recognized by the Supreme Court sounds in negative liberty” and 
citing all the pre-Obergefell marriage cases among the examples. Anne L. Alstott, 
Neoliberalism in U.S. Family Law: Negative Liberty and Laissez-Faire Markets in the 
Minimal State, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 25, 27 (2014). Kenji Yoshino sees in marriage 
a negative right, in addition to a positive right:  
[M]arriage is a negative right in that it creates a zone of privacy into which the state 
cannot intrude, as we see in privacy cases such as Griswold, which spoke of the 
“sacred precincts of the marital bedroom,” or in the testimonial privileges that permit 
spouses to refuse to testify against each other.  
Yoshino, supra note 40, at 168–69 (footnote omitted) (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485). 
I disagree with both Alstott and Yoshino. For reasons stated above, the state’s active 
involvement in marriage necessarily distinguishes it from those constitutional family rights 
that “sound in negative liberty.” See supra notes 70–80 and accompanying text. Further, I 
see the protection accorded by the right to privacy or the recognition of testimonial 
privileges as positive—part of the package of benefits triggered by marital status. Put 
differently, state-granted marriage licenses provide the gateway to these benefits. See 
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 951 (Mass. 2003) (discussing the 
“gatekeeping” function of the marriage-license statute).  
 144 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594.  
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at 2608. Several of the dissenting opinions share this view. See, e.g., id. at 2612 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2636 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 147 Id. at 2594 (majority opinion). 
 148 Id. (emphasis added). 
 149 For support for this view, see Joel A. Nichols, Misunderstanding Marriage and 
Missing Religion, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 195, 197–201, which asserts that marriage is 
pre-political. 
 150 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
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So read, Obergefell evokes references to natural law,151 ecclesiastical (as 
opposed to civil) jurisdiction over marriage in medieval England,152 or even 
common law marriage153—which, despite the use of the word “law” and the 
criteria for legal recognition—still provides in some states a route to marital 
status without state participation.154 Even today, when the state role in 
marriage looms large, marriage reflects an amalgam of what the conventional 
wisdom would classify as public and private elements.155 As the majority 
asserts in Obergefell, “Marriage is sacred to those who live by their religions 
and offers unique fulfillment to those who find meaning in the secular 
realm.”156 Indeed, marriage itself serves as both a religious practice and the 
means to a civil status.157 Illustrating this dual character, a legal marriage may 
be performed by either religious clergy or a state official.158 
Given Justice Kennedy’s rhetoric, however, perhaps the most apt reference 
would be to biologists’ and social scientists’ claims about pair bonding as an 
observable human activity.159 Justice Kennedy suggests that, left to their own 
devices, people marry. Accordingly, by portraying marriage as inherently 
“natural,” like—say—sex,160 the Obergefell majority opinion can conclude 
                                                                                                                     
 151 See R.H. HELMHOLZ, NATURAL LAW IN COURT: A HISTORY OF LEGAL THEORY IN 
PRACTICE 2 (2015) (“Natural law theory . . . begins, with an assumption of congruence 
between law and basic features of man’s nature as they are thought to have existed from 
the beginning of time. God himself was natural law’s source.”). 
 152 See R.H. HELMHOLZ, MARRIAGE LITIGATION IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 25 (D.E.C. 
Yale ed., 1974). 
 153 See Ellen Kandoian, Cohabitation, Common Law Marriage, and the Possibility of a 
Shared Moral Life, 75 GEO. L.J. 1829, 1842 (1987) (identifying common law marriage as 
“the legal doctrine historically used to impose a traditional framework on informal 
[cohabitation] arrangements”). 
 154 Of course, the state becomes involved and its criteria for legal recognition become 
determinative in disputes about whether a couple had a common law marriage or not. See, 
e.g., Winfield v. Renfro, 821 S.W.2d 640, 645 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991). Although such 
disputes mostly occur today at the time of the relationship’s dissolution, suits to establish 
the relationship in ecclesiastical courts were a frequent feature of the medieval English 
regime of clandestine or “private marriage.” HELMHOLZ, supra note 152, at 30–31.  
 155 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 156 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015). 
 157 See id. at 2604–05 (identifying “civil marriage” as a fundamental constitutional 
right). See generally Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 158 For a typical statute, see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b–22 (West 2016). 
 159 See, e.g., Daniel Cere, Toward an Integrative Account of Parenthood, in WHAT IS 
PARENTHOOD? CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ABOUT THE FAMILY, supra note 2, at 19, 29 
(presenting “durable male-female pair-bonding” as an abiding characteristic of human 
society, in contrast to “promiscuous patterns of mating characteristic of primate species 
like the bonobos or macaques”). Of course, to the extent that Obergefell relies on this 
concept, it applies it to same-sex pairs, not just male-female pairs. 
 160 Of course, many modern theorists understand sex and sexualities not as products of 
an inner drive but rather as performances of socially constructed scripts. See, e.g., JEFFREY 
WEEKS, SEXUALITY 18–23 (3d ed. 2010); Ken Plummer, Symbolic Interactionism and 
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that barriers to access violate this negative right.161 So understood, marriage 
restrictions operate like the sodomy restriction in Lawrence v. Texas, because 
they deprive individuals of liberty and interfere with their personal choices and 
conduct.162 M.L.B., the TPR-transcript case, does not undermine this rationale, 
given that state intervention in the private family triggers the procedural 
protection and thus makes this precedent distinguishable.163 
Just in case an understanding of marriage by itself as private presents too 
much of a conceptual stretch, however, the Obergefell majority opinion uses 
an additional maneuver to support this reading. The opinion proceeds to merge 
marriage with the protected rights to be free from unwarranted state intrusion 
in matters of sex, reproduction, and childrearing, calling all these interests 
together “a unified whole.”164 With this fusion, the private character of the 
rights protected in cases about sexual and family autonomy overshadows the 
public attributes of marriage, perhaps making them less distinctive and 
noticeable. 
b. Equalizing Liberty or Liberating Equality 
A second path arrives at the same result, that is, a reading of the 
Obergefell majority opinion based on a conception of liberty that would 
ordinarily be described as “private” or “negative.” This reading returns to the 
past marriage cases but then veers in a different direction, given how the 
Obergefell majority emphasizes that two of them—Loving and Zablocki—
along with M.L.B., the TPR case,165 rest on both due process (liberty) and 
equal protection (equality).166 (The majority similarly describes Eisenstadt v. 
Baird,167 Skinner v. Oklahoma,168 and Lawrence169—all traditionally 
considered negative liberty cases—and could have included Windsor here, too, 
                                                                                                                     
Sexual Conduct: An Emergent Perspective, in SEXUALITY AND GENDER 20, 23–24 
(Christine L. Williams & Arlene Stein eds., 2002). 
 161 See Powell, supra note 42, at 72 (distinguishing right to marry from right to 
marriage). 
 162 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003). 
 163 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120–21 (1996). In this way, M.L.B. resembles cases 
relying on the Due Process Clause to require counsel and a transcript for indigent criminal 
defendants. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963) (requiring counsel); 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17–19 (1956) (requiring transcripts for criminal appeals). 
 164 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015). Perhaps Yoshino suggests a 
similar fusion when he discerns in marriage both a negative right and a positive right. See 
supra note 143 (discussing Yoshino’s view).  
 165 See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 166 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602–04. 
 167 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453–55 (1972) (invalidating law prohibiting the 
distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons). 
 168 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 538, 541 (1942) (invalidating mandatory 
sterilization for those convicted of certain crimes). 
 169 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604. 
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which is a marriage case that rests on liberty as well as equality grounds.170) 
The majority proceeds to reason that both due process and equal protection 
provide the basis for a constitutional right to same-sex marriage,171 an 
approach that Cary Franklin named in earlier work “marrying liberty and 
equality”172 and that Kerry Abrams and Brandon Garrett use to illustrate their 
concept of “intersectional rights.”173 
Reliance on equal protection is significant because this guarantee protects 
against discriminatory distribution of state benefits, without making such 
benefits themselves constitutionally required as a matter of liberty.174 Thus, 
for example, if a state provided private school tuition for poor white children 
but not poor children of color, the scheme would violate equal protection even 
though the Constitution does not guarantee subsidized private schooling.175 To 
remedy such violations of equal protection, the state could either halt the 
subsidies for white children or extend them to all children.  
That leaves Turner v. Safley,176 the inmate right-to-marry case, which—
unlike the other marriage precedents—did not rely on equality along with 
liberty. Yet, the incarceration of the challengers in Turner would trigger the 
special duties that the state owes to individuals in its custody, a principle 
reaffirmed in dicta in DeShaney.177 Turner’s custodial context distinguishes 
this precedent factually (and thus legally) from the pure private liberty cases178 
and means that equality was unnecessary to activate affirmative government 
obligations.  
Setting Turner aside because of its distinctive prison context, then, we 
might understand Obergefell to confine liberty simpliciter to the protection of 
negative rights, while looking to equal protection to compel a more even 
distribution of benefits once the state has made them available only to some.179 
                                                                                                                     
 170 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013); see Cary Franklin, 
Marrying Liberty and Equality: The New Jurisprudence of Gay Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 
817, 886 (2014); see also supra note 134. For further elaboration of how liberty and 
equality work together in Obergefell, see Yoshino, supra note 40, at 171–79. 
 171 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604. 
 172 Franklin, supra note 170, at 817.  
 173 Kerry Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett, Cumulative Constitutional Rights, 97 B.U. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2642640 
[https://perma.cc/9WBL-GXYW]. 
 174 See Sullivan, supra note 90, at 1425 (“Of course, government may not distribute 
even ‘gratuitous’ benefits completely arbitrarily or at its discretion. Such gratuities, like all 
government action, must satisfy at least a requirement of minimal rationality.”). 
 175 See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 176 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 94–96 (1987). 
 177 See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 198–201 
(1989). 
 178 See, e.g., Roe v. Crawford, 514 F.3d 789, 793–98 (8th Cir. 2008) (applying Turner 
to a challenge of a prison policy refusing to transport inmates for elective abortions). 
 179 For a pre-Obergefell argument embracing this approach, see Tebbe & Widiss, 
supra note 71, at 1377. 
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In Obergefell, the Court was responding to a regime that denied to same-sex 
couples the benefits of marriage made available to cross-sex couples, in turn 
damaging the dignity of the former.180  
Of course, one might well ask why the Equal Protection Clause alone 
could not have done all the work necessary to reach the Obergefell result. 
Certainly, this was a route open to the Court—whether based on sexual-
orientation discrimination181 or sex discrimination.182 Indeed, the Solicitor 
General’s Brief for the United States made a forceful case for the 
unconstitutionality of gay marriage bans based exclusively on the Equal 
Protection Clause.183 Yet, the equal protection route was open as well in 
Lawrence v. Texas,184 where Justice Kennedy previously displayed his 
preference for liberty over equality (although—as we have seen—that case 
struck down state action, instead of requiring it). Despite this contrast between 
the two cases, called out by the Obergefell dissents,185 in both Justice Kennedy 
assigns liberty the starring role even while also giving equality a secondary 
part to play.186 
3. Feminist—or Critical—or “Queer” Liberty? 
Instead of wondering whether to classify the Obergefell majority’s notion 
of liberty as private or public, negative or positive, we might see the opinion as 
a direct challenge to the dominant categorical approach altogether. The 
opinion defies standard legal binaries when it fuses into “a unified whole”187 
positive and negative rights (or marriage, on one hand, and freedoms related to 
sex, reproduction, and childrearing, on the other). Blurring such boundaries 
evokes moves that often characterize feminist, critical, and queer theory,188 so 
                                                                                                                     
 180 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015). 
 181 See Nicolas, supra note 30, at 138. 
 182 See, e.g., Appleton, Missing in Action?, supra note 2, at 116; cf. Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 600 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting how traditional marriage 
laws rest on sex-based classifications).  
 183 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 11, 
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574), 2015 WL 1004710, at 
*11. The brief argued that sexual-orientation discrimination evokes heightened scrutiny, 
which the States’ asserted justifications for gay marriage bans failed to satisfy. 
 184 Justice O’Connor wrote a separate concurring opinion in Lawrence because she 
would have invalidated the Texas sodomy prohibition on the basis of equal protection, 
instead of relying on liberty, which Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion used. Lawrence, 
539 U.S. at 579–85 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Commentators nonetheless saw equality 
values at work in the majority opinion in Lawrence. E.g., Karlan, supra note 141, at 1449; 
Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups and the Due Process Clause, 55 
UCLA L. REV. 99, 101–02 (2007). 
 185 See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2620 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 186 See Yoshino, supra note 40, at 168. 
 187 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600. 
 188 See, e.g., Adam P. Romero, Methodological Descriptions: “Feminist” and 
“Queer” Legal Theories, 19 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 227, 246–48 (2007) (book review). 
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such adjectives might serve as descriptors for this version of Obergefell’s 
liberty. 
Under this reading, Obergefell’s liberty need be neither public nor 
private—or, it can be both—because any distinction is purely artificial, as 
feminists, among others, long have told us.189 Indeed, in delineating and 
maintaining a divide between public and private or positive and negative, the 
state performs substantial regulatory work.190 This is so in part because the 
legal discourse that expresses the conventional wisdom about liberty helps to 
construct the very categories it purports to describe.191 Upon close inspection, 
no law-free baseline exists from which the purely natural springs.192 
Critiques of the abortion-funding cases made a similar point when they 
emphasized that the failure to subsidize abortion did not take place in isolation 
but, instead, formed part of a program in which the state actively provided 
funding for prenatal care and delivery for poor pregnant women.193 Similarly, 
the state acted in returning Joshua DeShaney to his father’s custody, and he 
was made worse off by the initial intervention of child welfare officials, whose 
participation might well have discouraged others from rescuing this child.194 
Indeed, that such child welfare systems exist across the states refutes any 
suggestion that family law focuses only on private matters.195 And even 
axioms such as statements of a child’s “natural[]” dependence on parents for 
subsistence belie the role of law—that is, the state—in producing such 
realities.196 
                                                                                                                     
Even if Justice Kennedy’s opinion is methodologically transgressive, its glorification of 
marriage is deeply conservative and thus hardly queer on the merits. See supra notes 144–
48 and accompanying text. 
 189 See, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 56, at 150–55. 
 190 See, e.g., Olsen, supra note 50, at 862 n.73. 
 191 See, e.g., Mary Joe Frug, Commentary, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto 
(An Unfinished Draft), 105 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1046 (1992); Laura A. Rosenbury, 
Postmodern Feminist Legal Theory: A Contingent, Contextual Account, in FEMINIST 
LEGAL THEORY IN THE UNITED STATES AND ASIA: A DIALOGUE (Cynthia Grant Bowman 
ed., forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 2–7), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2834664 [https://perma. 
cc/P64R-4G7V]. 
 192 Olsen, supra note 48, at 1506 (“The status quo itself [regarding families] is treated 
as something natural and not as the responsibility of the state.”); see also Hale, supra note 
56, at 475–76. 
 193 See, e.g., Michael J. Perry, Why the Supreme Court Was Plainly Wrong in the Hyde 
Amendment Case: A Brief Comment on Harris v. McRae, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1113, 1121–24 
(1980). 
 194 See Bandes, supra note 55, at 2286–97. 
 195 See, e.g., CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES 
FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS 75–76 (2014). See generally DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED 
BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE (2002) (criticizing how the child welfare system 
undervalues minority families). 
 196 See Olsen, supra note 50, at 851–52 n.46 (showing how children’s dependency is 
based on law); see also Hale, supra note 56, at 471 (“What is the government doing when 
it ‘protects a property right’?”). 
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From this perspective, we might see the Obergefell majority’s admixture 
of public and private liberty precedents to create “a unified whole” as a 
refreshing departure from the conventional wisdom and the public/private and 
positive/negative distinctions themselves. Likewise, by blending liberty and 
equality and eschewing the traditional tiers of constitutional scrutiny,197 as 
Lawrence did as well,198 the majority frees itself from the confining analysis 
required by categories. With the categories themselves as contingent and 
contested terrain, we might even have a potentially postmodern version of 
liberty,199 but not in the way that Justice Alito has explained that label and 
without the derogatory implications of his remark.200 
IV. UNLOCKING LIBERTY AND PRIVACY: THE MARRIAGE KEY 
Although I find that each of the readings of “liberty” presented above 
plausibly derives from Obergefell’s language and the precedents invoked, 
some strike me as more compelling than others. In this Part, I explain why by 
taking a more evaluative and forward-looking stance. Part A shifts the focus 
from close analysis to the doctrinal and normative implications of each of the 
readings of “liberty.” Part B then “connects the dots” to develop a more 
expansive view of the interlocking trajectories of family law and constitutional 
law. Here, we see that family law and its core policies, including the special 
role of marriage, offer important cues about constitutional law, past, present, 
and future.  
A. Whither Obergefell’s Liberties? 
It is tempting to mine the analysis and rhetoric of Obergefell for messages 
about doctrinal developments and decisions yet to come. For example, Kenji 
Yoshino, who embraces what I have called the “public liberty reading,”201 
draws expansive conclusions from the majority opinion. Yoshino argues that 
Justice Kennedy might well have relied principally on liberty, instead of 
equality, “deliberately eliding the negative/positive liberty distinction” in order 
“to revamp the substantive due process inquiry tout court” and yielding 
“radical implications,” including a different outcome in DeShaney.202 
I am inclined to take a more skeptical and cautious view, however. Despite 
the fun of making big-picture predictions, Obergefell’s text and its multiple 
                                                                                                                     
 197 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
§ 6.5 (5th ed. 2015) (describing “the levels of scrutiny”). 
 198 See, e.g., Eric Berger, Lawrence’s Stealth Constitutionalism and Same-Sex 
Marriage Litigation, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765, 767 (2013). 
 199 See, e.g., MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 121–
22 (3d ed. 2013). 
 200 See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text. 
 201 See supra notes 130–37 and accompanying text. 
 202 See Yoshino, supra note 40, at 168. 
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readings leave uncertain what the case means beyond the immediate issue of 
same-sex marriage bans.203 Indeed, although Justice Kennedy often writes for 
a majority, several observers see his opinions as idiosyncratic204 and unlikely 
to have staying power beyond his time as the Court’s “swing justice.”205 
Whatever force such critiques might have had at the time Obergefell was 
announced, it acquired new salience with the unexpected death of Justice 
Scalia just months later,206 the political firestorm sparked by the effort to bring 
the Court back to full strength,207 and the inability of an eight-Justice Court to 
decide some important cases of the 2015–2016 Term.208 All this “breaking 
                                                                                                                     
 203 Obergefell did not resolve a variety of LGBTQ family law issues that have arisen in 
its wake. For example, a divided Michigan Supreme Court refused to review a holding 
below that a nonbiological parent cannot invoke the doctrine of equitable parentage in 
order to obtain standing in a custody case, although the dissenting judge would have 
reached a different result, given that the adults in question were prohibited from marrying 
before Obergefell. Mabry v. Mabry, 882 N.W.2d 539 (Mich. 2016). The U.S. Supreme 
Court found a per curiam opinion necessary to compel Alabama to give full faith and 
credit to an adoption decree issued to a same-sex couple by a Georgia court. V.L. v. E.L., 
136 S. Ct. 1017 (2016). Commentators are grappling with what marriage equality means 
for legal parentage and access thereto. See Martha A. Field, Compensated Surrogacy, 89 
WASH. L. REV. 1155 (2014); Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New 
Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1185 (2016); see also Megan Jula, 4 Lesbians Sue over 
New Jersey Rules on Fertility Treatments, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/09/nyregion/lesbian-couple-sues-over-new-jersey-rules-
for-fertility-treatment.html [https://perma.cc/53XY-523C] (reporting challenge to insurance 
coverage requirement of two years of unprotected sexual intercourse to establish 
infertility). 
 204 See, e.g., Robert C. Farrell, Justice Kennedy’s Idiosyncratic Understanding of 
Equal Protection and Due Process, and Its Costs, 32 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 439, 439–40 
(2014). 
 205 The popular press has often referred to Justice Kennedy as the Court’s “swing 
justice.” See Dahlia Lithwick, Anthony Kennedy’s Right to Choose, SLATE (Nov. 17, 2015), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/11/kennedy_and_supreme
_court_should_vote_against_texas_abortion_law_in_cole.html [https://perma.cc/HL2T-PPW8]; 
see also Wilson Andrews et al., How Scalia Compared with Other Justices, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 14, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/02/14/us/supreme-court-justice-
ideology-scalia.html [https://perma.cc/3XR7-FWSE] (stating, upon the death of Justice 
Scalia and with eight Justices remaining, “Justice Anthony M. Kennedy is likely to be the 
swing vote in most cases”). 
 206 Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html 
[https://perma.cc/Z5YU-2RYU].  
 207 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Study Calls Snub of Obama’s Supreme Court Pick 
Unprecedented, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/14/us/politics 
/obama-supreme-court-merrick-garland.html [https://perma.cc/ NY8S-YV52].  
 208 E.g., United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016) (mem.) (equally divided 
Court affirms decision below blocking executive actions on immigration); Friedrichs v. 
Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (mem.) (equally divided Court affirms 
decision below permitting compulsory dues for public sector employees); see Linda 
Greenhouse, The Supreme Court’s Post-Scalia Term, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2016), 
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news,” followed by the 2016 presidential election, coming so soon after 
Obergefell, recalls the lessons of legal realism,209 which highlight the 
difficulties of assessing the long-term doctrinal impact of even landmark 
opinions. 
With these disclaimers, however, we can consider the provocative, and 
sometimes paradoxical, implications of each of the different readings 
presented above. This Part revisits each in turn. 
1. The Public Liberty Reading 
The public conception of liberty revives the possibility of a minimum 
welfare right or other affirmative obligations of government as a matter of 
constitutional law. Under this reading, one could argue that marriage creates a 
wedge that might open the door to additional positive rights.210 This is 
precisely Yoshino’s position, as noted above.211 I would certainly welcome 
such developments, not only because of my disagreement with the reasoning 
and outcomes in the abortion-funding cases and DeShaney. In addition, given 
the rise of neoliberalism,212 the diminishing safety net accomplished through 
welfare reform,213 and growing economic inequality,214 a constitutional right 
to minimum subsistence becomes perhaps even more meaningful and urgent 
today than it was during the heyday of the welfare-rights thesis.215  
For these reasons, I wish I could share Yoshino’s optimism. As I see it, 
however, the very “neoliberal political culture”216 that accentuates the need for 
                                                                                                                     
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/23/opinion/the-supreme-courts-post-scalia-term.html 
[https://perma.cc/R4E9-Q2MF]; Adam Liptak, A Supreme Court Not So Much Deadlocked 
as Diminished, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/18/us/politics 
/consensus-supreme-court-roberts.html [https://perma.cc/WW5R-6C7A].  
 209 As Brian Leiter has explained, legal realism has embraced several different 
approaches, with some emphasizing that facts rather than law determine how judges decide 
cases and others contending that the judges’ own personalities are the dominant factor. 
Leiter, supra note 97, at 280–81. At least for the former, case outcomes fall into 
discernable patterns. Id. at 281. 
 210 See Hong, supra note 42, at 1438–39. 
 211 See supra note 202 and accompanying text (summarizing Yoshino’s position). 
 212 See, e.g., DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 2 (2005) (defining 
neoliberalism as “a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-
being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills 
within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free 
markets, and free trade,” with the state’s role operating “to create and preserve an 
institutional framework appropriate to such practices”). 
 213 E.g., Alstott, supra note 143, at 28–29. 
 214 See, e.g., Drew DeSilver, The Many Ways to Measure Economic Inequality, PEW 
RES. CTR. (Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/09/22/the-many-
ways-to-measure-economic-inequality/ [https://perma.cc/3P56-CF54].  
 215 See supra notes 85–92 and accompanying text. 
 216 ROBERT O. SELF, ALL IN THE FAMILY: THE REALIGNMENT OF AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY SINCE THE 1960S 400 (2012). 
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government support today makes recognition of such a constitutional right 
even less likely now than it was before, notwithstanding this reading of 
Obergefell. Indeed, the Court’s limitations on remedies for constitutional 
wrongs would present significant difficulties for enforcing a minimum-
substance right, even if one were recognized.217  
Marriage and its unique properties, however, can help reconcile wishful 
thinking about welfare rights with the modern neoliberal turn. Even if we 
understand the constitutional right to marry as public and hence as a positive 
right, entry into marriage functions as a major gateway for private support 
obligations, explaining why the state incentivizes marriage.218 As the 
Obergefell majority points out: “just as a couple vows to support each other, so 
does society pledge to support the couple, offering symbolic recognition and 
material benefits to protect and nourish the union.”219 Courtney Joslin, among 
others, has called attention to the government-granted privileges and subsidies 
that marriage provides.220 To the extent a cost-benefit analysis is at work, the 
state gains (or assumes it gains) more than it loses from its investment in and 
support of marriage. Although marriage long predates contemporary talk of 
neoliberalism,221 neoliberals would have invented marriage had it not already 
existed! Marriage locates the primary source of support for dependents in the 
“private sphere,” consistent with neoliberalism’s deference to laissez-faire 
markets and the minimal state.222 If anything, our modern era has witnessed—
consistent with neoliberalism—the extension of the private obligations once 
associated only with marriage to other relationships, most notably support 
duties for nonmarital children.223 Guaranteeing same-sex couples a right to 
                                                                                                                     
 217 See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 51 (1990) (calling for a causation-based 
approach that places “the responsibility for solutions to the problems of segregation upon 
those who have themselves created the problems”). 
 218 See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text. 
 219 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015). 
 220 Courtney G. Joslin, Family Support and Supporting Families, 68 VAND. L. REV. EN 
BANC 153, 156 (2015); see also, e.g., POLIKOFF, supra note 70, at 126, 129 (calling 
marriage “[t]he [w]rong [d]ividing [l]ine” and concluding that “[g]iving privileges to those 
who make the unenforceable promise of commitment over those who have carried out that 
commitment is the triumph of formalism over function”); Vivian Hamilton, Mistaking 
Marriage for Social Policy, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 307, 361–62 (2004) (explaining 
problems in laws privileging marital families).  
 221 Scholars have described neoliberalism as an ideology—in economics, politics, and 
law—that recalls classic laissez-faire doctrines and that has advanced “over the past few 
decades” or “post-postwar.” David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law 
and Neoliberalism, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1, 4–5 (2014). 
 222 See Alstott, supra note 143, at 27; see also Fraser & Gordon, supra note 75, at 332 
(“The genealogy of dependency also expresses the modern emphasis on individual 
personality.”). 
 223 For the legal developments that replaced discrimination against children born out of 
marriage, including the absence of paternal support obligations, with a doctrine of 
“personal responsibility” that imposes such obligations and relentlessly enforces them 
through both federal and state law, see Appleton, Illegitimacy and Sex, supra note 2, at 
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marry entails yet additional expansion of these private obligations, in line with 
neoliberal values,224 even if, to achieve this end, states must now offer 
marriage-based benefits to a larger segment of the population.225 
These considerations counsel against imagining that Obergefell heralds a 
new dawn of enforceable positive or welfare rights. In fact, Justice Kennedy 
goes out of his way to describe marriage in exceptional terms,226 apart from 
the private support duties it triggers, suggesting that he regards the issue in 
Obergefell as distinctive. That, in turn, might well lessen the likelihood that 
Obergefell will function as an important precedent to secure other state 
benefits as a matter of constitutional law. 
2. The Private Liberty Readings 
a. Naturalizing Marriage 
Turning next to the first private conception of liberty, we can discern in 
the majority opinion a depiction of marriage as a “natural,” even inevitable, 
feature of human existence. Justice Thomas’s dissent articulates this view even 
more explicitly and forcefully (but for a different result).227 Given Justice 
                                                                                                                     
360–64. See also Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 669–70 (Cal. 2005) 
(recognizing mother’s former partner as the twins’ second mother so that the state may 
collect reimbursement for child support from her). 
 224 Before Obergefell, when states were considering domestic partnership laws, 
empirical studies showed that such reforms would have beneficial effects on state budgets 
by reducing the number of people eligible for means-tested public assistance. See, e.g., 
M.V. LEE BADGETT ET AL., WILLIAMS INST., THE IMPACT OF THE COLORADO DOMESTIC 
PARTNERSHIP ACT ON COLORADO’S STATE BUDGET 4–7 (Oct. 2006), 
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Badgett-Sears-Lee-MacCartney-
CO-DP-Benefits-Econ-Report-Oct-2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/BA7S-VRE7]. We can 
presume that the availability of marriage for same-sex couples would produce similar 
economic consequences. 
 225 Suppose a state or the federal government claims that it cannot afford to extend the 
material benefits of marriage to same-sex couples. In attempting to defend its ban on same-
sex marriage, Massachusetts unsuccessfully argued that it had an interest, inter alia, in 
“preserving scarce State and private financial resources.” Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. 
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003). I presume that the governmental entity in 
question could distribute the available pool of benefits fairly among all married couples, 
even if that resulted in a reduction for those who previously enjoyed marriage before the 
inclusion of same-sex couples. In other words, if need be, the same pool of funds would be 
distributed among a larger number of married couples. See also infra notes 343–44 and 
accompanying text (noting how some marital benefits cost the state nothing). 
 226 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593–94 (2015). 
 227 Not only does Justice Thomas double down on a limited interpretation of “liberty” 
that protects only negative rights, but he also ascribes to the Framers’ understanding 
a natural right to marriage that fell within the broader definition of liberty . . . [and] 
would not have included a right to governmental recognition and benefits. Instead, it 
would have included a right to engage in the very same activities that petitioners have 
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Kennedy’s outcome, however, this reading raises intriguing questions about 
the precise relationship of the state to marriage. On the one hand, a view of 
marriage as natural lends support to proposals for “taking marriage private,”228 
that is, proposals that would remove the state from the marriage business while 
leaving marrying as a purely religious or personal celebration, say, like a bar 
mitzvah or a first communion. Under such proposals, civil marriage, as we 
know it, would cease to exist, along with all the rewards and benefits the state 
attaches to the status of being married. We can find models for this approach 
in other countries, such as Israel, where marriage is strictly a religious 
institution open only to a narrow class of individuals who meet specified 
sectarian requirements, with various civil remedies available when 
relationships dissolve, regardless of marriage.229 In the United States, such 
proposals have come from those who want the state to wash its hands of a 
patriarchal institution that denigrates families who do not conform.230 Such 
proposals have also come from those resisting constitutional protection for 
same-sex marriage—for example, an Alabama legislator who would prefer for 
the state to license no marriages at all than to include same-sex couples.231  
Certainly, abolishing civil marriage altogether would be a plausible 
remedy if the constitutional violation found in Obergefell had sounded 
exclusively or even primarily in inequality. Cross-sex couples would no longer 
have access to benefits denied to same-sex couples, eliminating the 
discrimination, unless the animus-driven motive for the abolition itself would 
run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause.232 Yet, as we have seen, Obergefell 
invokes liberty, not equality, as the principal foundation of its holding. 
                                                                                                                     
been left free to engage in—making vows, holding religious ceremonies celebrating 
those vows, raising children, and otherwise enjoying the society of one’s spouse—
without governmental interference. 
Id. at 2636 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Nichols, supra note 149, at 197–201 
(emphasizing pre-political and religious aspects of marriage). 
 228 Stephanie Coontz, Taking Marriage Private, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/26/opinion/26coontz.html [https://perma.cc/TR98-SNZY]. 
 229 See, e.g., Zvi Triger, “A Jewish and Democratic State:” Reflections on the 
Fragility of Israeli Secularism, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 1091, 1092 (2014) (setting out elements 
and “roots of the religious monopoly over personal status issues in Israel”); Ayelet 
Blecher-Prigat, “Divorcing” Marriage from the Law: The Case of Israel (unpublished 
working draft) (on file with author) (contending that Israel’s unique religious monopoly 
over marriage makes it an apt setting to explore proposals to abolish legal marriage). 
 230 See, e.g., POLIKOFF, supra note 70, at 126 (criticizing marriage as the wrong 
“dividing line” for the distribution of rights and responsibilities); Patricia A. Cain, Imagine 
There’s No Marriage, 16 QLR 27, 29 (1996). 
 231 See Shane Trejo, Alabama Senate Passes Bill to Effectively Nullify All Sides on 
Marriage, TENTH AMEND. CTR. (May 23, 2015), http://blog.tenthamendmentcenter.com/20 
15/05/alabama-senate-passes-bill-to-effectively-nullify-all-sides-on-marriage/ [https://perm 
a.cc/Y3NE-24XM]. 
 232 See Pamela S. Karlan, Let’s Call the Whole Thing Off: Can States Abolish the 
Institution of Marriage?, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 697, 702–04 (2010). 
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Further, the opinion’s encomia to marriage make it hard to imagine that the 
majority, or at least Justice Kennedy, would countenance the state’s extricating 
itself from marriage at this point in history. State-operated, state-supported 
marriage now constitutes the status quo—the current baseline for this “natural” 
practice. As Pamela Karlan has written, “the government’s unbroken historical 
practice of providing official recognition and protection to family relationships 
has hardened into a liberty interest.”233 That would seem to be especially true 
of marriage.234 Against this background and with Obergefell’s treatment of 
restrictions on marrying portrayed as a deprivation of liberty, state withdrawal 
from marriage becomes constitutionally problematic. So, by naturalizing 
marriage and portraying it as protected activity comparable to sex, 
reproduction, and childrearing, Obergefell might paradoxically entrench, even 
require, state involvement—as a matter of liberty.235  
The majority’s naturalizing rhetoric has additional perverse effects. First, 
it embeds “civil marriage,”236 a “public institution,”237 in our intimate lives, 
notwithstanding judicial language celebrating personal freedom of choice in 
such matters.238 Second, it camouflages the disciplinary purpose and role of 
marriage. When the state seeks to guide sexual and domestic activities into 
marriage,239 it embraces marital norms (and laws) of exclusivity, fidelity, and 
                                                                                                                     
 233 Id. at 705–06. As Karlan explains, 
Particularly in contemporary society, where a passel of benefits and obligations 
depends on official recognition of family relationships, it is hard to imagine a 
government stepping out of the arena altogether and leaving individuals to negotiate 
their obligations to support children, their rights to employee benefits, and their 
divisions of property without any default rules set by the state. 
Id. at 705. Yet, I read that explanation as rooted in practical concerns, rather than 
constitutional mandate. In contrast to Karlan, Patricia Cain has concluded that due process 
does not prevent a state from abolishing marriage. Cain, supra note 230, at 42–43. 
Likewise, Nelson Tebbe and Deborah Widiss contend that, under a liberty approach, 
“states could almost certainly get out of the marriage business altogether, leaving marriage 
to religious groups or other private institutions” without violating any constitutional rights. 
Tebbe & Widiss, supra note 71, at 1378–79. 
 234 Karlan continues: “Whether the state was required to create marriage in the first 
place, marriage has since become a privilege essential to happiness.” Karlan, supra note 
232, at 706. 
 235 See also Yoshino, supra note 40, at 173 (opining that an equality-based ruling 
would have allowed the state to level down by refusing to grant marriage licenses to all 
couples—an option foreclosed by a liberty-based ruling). 
 236 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (quoting Goodridge v. Dep’t of 
Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955 (Mass. 2003)). 
 237 Id. at 2601 (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 213 (1888)). 
 238 See Appleton, Forgotten Family Law, supra note 2, at 41–46 (examining how 
family law rests on conflicting values, autonomy and regulation). 
 239 See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text. 
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obligation.240 Marriage domesticates and tames, a truism that prompted some 
political conservatives eventually to support same-sex marriage.241 Whether or 
not marriage is “punishment,”242 its disciplinary purpose and role seem 
beyond dispute243—a point emphasized in Justice Scalia’s Obergefell 
dissent.244 Yet, by presenting marriage as an inherent aspect of human nature, 
disconnected from the state, Obergefell masks such constraints.245 
Finally, by conjoining marriage with sex, reproduction, and childrearing 
(making them “a unified whole”),246 this first private-liberty reading of 
Obergefell leaves nonmarital sex, reproduction, and childrearing as marginal 
practices.247 Obergefell’s glorification of marriage, its history, and its 
                                                                                                                     
 240 With respect to exclusivity, despite liberalization of marriage and divorce laws, still 
a person can have only one spouse at a time and, despite contemporary activism, bigamy 
prohibitions have escaped successful challenge. See, e.g., Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 
1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 2016). With respect to fidelity, as I have pointed out before, the 
emergence of unilateral no-fault divorce has made clear that this marital value is optional 
and that a marriage can continue with it or without it depending on personal choice. See 
Susan Frelich Appleton, Toward a “Culturally Cliterate” Family Law?, 23 BERKELEY J. 
GENDER, L. & JUST. 267, 294–95 (2008) (noting how “in the prevailing no-fault divorce 
regime, adultery provides neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for divorce, so 
marriages marked by adultery may or may not survive”). Finally, the expectation of 
obligation is concretized in the rise of the partnership theory of marriage with equitable 
division of marital property taking effect at divorce, the persistence of alimony (or 
maintenance) as a separate remedy for some, and robust efforts to regularize and enforce 
child support duties. See, e.g., JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE 
THE CASTLE: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 196–205, 223–31 (2011). 
 241 See generally JONATHAN RAUCH, GAY MARRIAGE: WHY IT IS GOOD FOR GAYS, 
GOOD FOR STRAIGHTS, AND GOOD FOR AMERICA (2004) (addressing concerns from across 
the political spectrum to explain why gay marriage will benefit society); Jason Lee Steorts, 
An Equal Chance at Love: Why We Should Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, NAT’L REV. 
(May 19, 2015), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/418515/yes-same-sex-marriage-
about-equality-courts-should-not-decide [https://perma.cc/4JXV-G2E2] (invoking fairness 
concerns to argue that same-sex couples should have the same access to marriage as cross-
sex couples). 
 242 Melissa Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2012). 
 243 See id. at 51–52. 
 244 See id. at 39–64; see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2630 (2015) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[O]ne would think Freedom of Intimacy is abridged rather than 
expanded by marriage. Ask the nearest hippie.”).  
 245 See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Interpreting Liberty and Equality Through the Lens of 
Marriage, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 107, 107–08 (2015). 
 246 Although I suggested earlier that this fusion allows rights traditionally classified as 
“negative” to overshadow the “positive right” characteristics of marriage, see supra note 
164 and accompanying text, here I suggest that—through this fusion—Obergefell’s 
emphasis on marriage might well diminish how some of the precedents about negative 
rights once directly challenged marital supremacy. See Appleton, Forgotten Family Law, 
supra note 2, at 53–54.  
 247 Conversely, this joinder could be read to marginalize marriages that do not include 
reproduction and childrearing. Cf. Cynthia Godsoe, Marriage Equality and the “New” 
Maternalism, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 145, 147 (2015) (criticizing “the maternalism infusing 
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rewards248 reinforces this message,249 for example, providing a new rationale 
for lower courts to reject financial and parentage claims after a nonmarital 
relationship ends.250 Indeed, Obegefell’s elevation of marriage might itself 
reflect a “channeling” move,251 that is, an effort to encourage marriage and 
discourage other family forms and intimate associations, thus perhaps making 
certain negative rights less attractive to exercise252 and effectively working the 
very humiliation of children (and adults) living outside marriage that the 
majority condemns in restrictive marriage laws.253 As I have observed 
elsewhere, the opinion reads like “a public-service announcement designed to 
persuade the uncommitted to join the marital ranks,”254 possibly in an effort to 
counter the growing percentage of nonmarital families—a trend often called 
the “retreat from marriage.”255 
Even with its paradoxical and perverse implications, I find this reading 
well supported by the majority opinion’s language and its use of precedent. It 
assumes a special role for marriage but therefore leaves open Obergefell’s 
                                                                                                                     
the Obergefell opinion” and its “traditional view of women’s place in the family and in the 
public sphere”). 
 248 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593–94. 
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 250 See Blumenthal v. Brewer, No. 118781, 2016 WL 6235511, at *20 (Ill. Aug. 18, 
2016) (“Indeed, now that the centrality of the marriage has been recognized as a 
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 251 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
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Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).  
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opposite sex”). But see Courtney G. Joslin, The Gay Rights Canon and the Right to 
Nonmarriage, 97 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017); Laurence H. Tribe, Response, Equal 
Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16, 31–32 (2015) (arguing the “equal 
dignity” approach used in Obergefell extends to those who choose alternatives to 
marriage). 
 254 Appleton, Forgotten Family Law, supra note 2, at 24. 
 255 See Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, Cohabitation and the Uneven Retreat 
from Marriage in the United States, 1950–2010, in HUMAN CAPITAL IN HISTORY: THE 
AMERICAN RECORD 241, 241–50 (Leah Platt Boustan et al. eds., 2014). For other 
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SAWHILL, GENERATION UNBOUND: DRIFTING INTO SEX AND PARENTHOOD WITHOUT 
MARRIAGE (2014). 
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impact on other controversies, including those about parentage and nonmarital 
families that we can expect to follow in the case’s wake.256  
b. Equalizing Liberty or Liberating Equality 
The second private-liberty reading, synthesizing liberty and equality, holds 
promise because it can help dismantle biased stereotypes about LGBTQ 
persons.257 In addition, like the public liberty reading, it can provide a foothold 
for positive rights, particularly a right to minimum welfare. Welfare rights 
acquire a more substantial constitutional basis when inequality becomes part 
of the analysis. As we have seen, an uneven distribution of benefits can 
present unconstitutional discrimination even if the underlying benefit is not 
itself guaranteed.258 Indeed, given the difficulty that some would have in 
classifying as a deprivation of liberty a state’s failure to take action or provide 
a particular benefit, it should come as no surprise that the key cases once 
interpreted to suggest the possibility of a minimum welfare right were decided 
on equal protection grounds.259 Today, with the clash between neoliberal 
values and the idea of a welfare right,260 incorporating equal protection into 
the analysis could prove even more significant. The remedy for the 
constitutional violation might well entail the extension of benefits to a larger 
population, as in Obergefell.261 
Nonetheless, Obergefell’s methodology, so read, could present risks for 
equal protection doctrine. Will the abandonment of tiers of scrutiny262 in the 
                                                                                                                     
 256 See supra note 203. 
 257 Cary Franklin makes this point. Franklin, supra note 170, at 885–86. 
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 260 See supra notes 212–15 and accompanying text. 
 261 See supra notes 174–75 and accompanying text. 
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S. Ct. 2292, 2327 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Thus, he writes, “[t]hese labels now 
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LGBTQ cases (even if valuable in that context)263 dilute the review of other 
sorts of discriminatory classifications? Does subsuming equal protection into 
liberty make the former so dependent on the latter that it has no force of its 
own? Recall how Justice Kennedy’s first gay rights opinion, in Romer v. 
Evans, rested on the Equal Protection Clause,264 but it did not identify an 
applicable standard of review. Rather, it condemned unequal treatment that 
“raise[s] the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of 
animosity toward the class of persons affected,”265 a conclusion applied in 
later gay rights cases as well.266 But not every inequality that we might think 
should be ruled unconstitutional will be recognized as a deprivation of liberty 
or a reflection of animosity against the class affected—even by Justice 
Kennedy.  
Indeed, Justice Kennedy’s own opinions reflect a fluidity that complicates 
assessments of his approach to discrimination outside the gay rights context. 
For example, although his recent opinions on affirmative action267 and 
housing268 suggest a still evolving position, we can discern in Justice 
Kennedy’s earlier opinions a narrow understanding of both racial 
subordination and the continuing effects of past race-based discrimination—
even if the views of some of his colleagues are narrower still.269 In addition, 
Justice Kennedy, who has at best a mixed record in sex discrimination 
cases,270 embraced paternalism and reinforced gender-based inequalities in his 
majority opinion in Gonzales v. Carhart, which upheld the federal ban on 
                                                                                                                     
 263 See Franklin, supra note 170, at 857; cf. Hunter, supra note 245, at 113; Nicolas, 
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 269 See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2421; Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. 
No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 790–91 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Shelby Cty. v. 
Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (invalidating part of the Voting Rights Act by the 
majority, including Justice Kennedy). 
 270 See David S. Cohen, Justice Kennedy’s Gendered World, 59 S.C. L. REV. 673, 694 
(2008) (analyzing Justice Kennedy’s gender cases to find that he relies on stereotypes in 
family life, but rejects them in civic life). 
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“partial-birth abortion,” in large part based on the assumption that women later 
regret their pregnancy terminations.271 True, this opinion rested on liberty, not 
equality, but it has obvious ramifications for the legal treatment of women and 
their position in society, as Justice Ginsburg’s dissent pointed out.272 More 
recently, however, Justice Kennedy joined Justice Breyer’s majority opinion 
striking down burdensome and unnecessary abortion restrictions enacted under 
the guise of protecting women’s health.273 In fact, as the senior member of the 
majority in this new case, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, Justice 
Kennedy must have assigned the opinion to Justice Breyer, with whom he has 
stood at odds in earlier abortion cases.274  
Taken together, Justice Kennedy’s opinions about racial and gender 
inequality defy easy synthesis and forecasts. These opinions leave open the 
question whether equal protection will survive its incorporation into liberty in 
Obergefell to win other battles for social justice.275 Perhaps we can see 
Obergefell’s less than fully developed concept of constitutional equality as a 
first step toward a more robust understanding that Justice Kennedy is 
gradually embracing—but we cannot know for sure.  
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Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2292; cf. Linda Greenhouse, The Not-So-Liberal Roberts 
Court, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/07/opinion/the-not-so-
liberal-roberts-court.html [https://perma.cc/J99D-9HME] (analyzing Justice Kennedy’s 
position in Whole Woman’s Health). 
 275 For commentary on Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence of racial equality, see Heather 
K. Gerken, Justice Kennedy and the Domains of Equal Protection, 121 HARV. L. REV. 104 
(2007). On his jurisprudence of gender equality, see Cohen, supra note 270, at 694. In the 
meantime, Yoshino sees in Obergefell a principle of “antisubordination liberty,” which he 
theorizes should help members of all subordinated groups. See Yoshino, supra note 40, at 
174–75. 
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In addition to general concerns about equality doctrine, however, 
“marriage equality” as a more particular focus should give us pause, even 
while we celebrate Obergefell as a win for social justice. As Michael Warner 
emphasizes, marriage “is selective legitimacy.”276 Affording same-sex couples 
access to marriage still leaves the institution inherently exclusive.277 Further, 
marriage equality does little to address widening inequalities among 
families.278 To the extent such inequalities are economic, they stand as an 
unsurprising effect of keeping dependency private.279 To the extent the 
inequalities result from the marital/nonmarital “dividing line,” as Nancy 
Polikoff calls it,280 they highlight family law’s failure to pay attention to those 
outside marriage’s cover.281 
Highlighting such problems does not rule out the possibility of a sunnier 
outlook, however. Obergefell’s express concerns about the dignitary harm of 
excluding same-sex couples from a vaunted institution that has been open to 
others282 could suggest important work for the opinion’s equality thread, 
despite the more prominent role assigned to liberty.283 So understood, 
Obergefell’s impact might transcend marriage, paving the way for more 
equitable treatment of other nontraditional families284 and compelling an 
equal-dignity approach in the myriad disputes that can ensnare those who 
become parents as a same-sex couple.285 The critical question is whether 
marriage is and will be the sine qua non of Obergefell. 
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3. The Feminist—or Critical—or “Queer” Reading 
What I have called the feminist, critical, or “queer” reading shows promise 
in its defiance of the public/private and positive/negative binaries—and its 
methodological challenge to other categories as well. Using “postmodern” in a 
more approving way than Justice Alito did,286 we can say that this reading 
helps expose the work performed by legal language and the categories it 
creates.287 In turn, this reading takes an important step consistent with the 
insight that the state is inextricably part of family and sexual life,288 
constructing our human experience and very identity,289 regardless of the 
convenience of the “private sphere” label. Yet, Obergefell’s naturalization of 
marriage, discussed above,290 could portend just the reverse, given how it 
disguises the state’s role in this “public institution.” Moreover, the categories 
created by marriage itself (marital and nonmarital) retain their prominence, 
perhaps newly magnified, after Obergefell. 
What are the possibilities for Obergefell’s unconventional approach, as 
interpreted in this reading, to serve as a durable reformist tool? Attacking 
Justice Kennedy’s opinions for sloppiness and lack of rigor had become a 
cottage industry even before Obergefell.291 Accordingly, one could understand 
the Obergefell dissents’ censure of the conflation of positive and negative 
rights as a judicial version of this trope about sloppiness and lack of rigor. At 
the same time, these particular critiques might simply signal resistance to or 
discomfort with Justice Kennedy’s liberation from rigid categorical analysis 
(which, of course, the Fourteenth Amendment’s own words do not require). 
Moreover, these critiques of Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence intimate that he 
writes alone, when—in fact—Obergefell and his other category-defying gay 
rights opinions all commanded a majority.292 Finally, we should note the 
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possibility that Justice Kennedy deliberately chose obfuscation in Obergefell 
as a means of securing a majority without committing to what will happen 
next. 
A darker view of such uncertainties emerges from the critique by Louis 
Michael Seidman, who finds the majority opinion riddled with hypocrisy, 
deception, and manipulation,293 despite his support for the outcome. He finds 
particular fault with “lack of empathy and understanding” for those who are 
not married, whether by choice or necessity,294 and condemns the Court’s 
treatment of marriage as “deeply reactionary.”295 He asks the reader to take the 
position of a like-minded Justice:  
Constitutionalism helped produce a victory in this case, but it did so through 
mechanisms we should be ashamed of. Should we embrace constitutionalism 
and use its tools so as to preserve this victory and, perhaps, win others as 
well? Put differently, if you or I were a Justice on the Supreme Court, should 
we sign Justice Kennedy’s opinion? What if our vote was necessary to secure 
a majority?296  
Ultimately, “the real and daily human suffering”297 inflicted by gay 
marriage bans and the likelihood that our flawed constitutionalism298 will 
persist anyhow tip the balance for Seidman, who decides “yes, I would be 
tempted to join Justice Kennedy’s dreadful opinion.”299  
With the death of one of the most caustic detractors of Justice Kennedy’s 
jurisprudence, Justice Scalia, and the Court’s new composition still up for 
grabs even in the immediate aftermath of the 2016 election, we do not know 
who will actually face questions like Seidman’s and what each Justice’s 
inclinations will be. Open issues abound: How will the Court approach rights 
and interests other than marriage? How will it analyze classifications based on 
criteria other than sexual orientation, including race, gender, and class? What 
might be the consequences—both intended and unintended—of Obergefell’s 
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 295 Id. 
 296 Id. at 143. 
 297 Id. at 145. 
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 299 Seidman, supra note 13, at 145. 
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reasoning and rhetoric? A postmodern lens foregrounds the contingencies and 
thus accentuates the uncertainties. Yet, while Justice Alito worries that the 
result will be too much constitutional protection,300 my take-away from 
Obergefell is the concern that there could be too little, based on Obergefell’s 
expressed reverence for marriage, Justice Kennedy’s past positions on race 
and gender inequalities, and deep divisions on the Court. 
B. Synergistic Liberties: Constitutional Law and Family Law 
Although the multiple readings of “liberty” yield precious little about what 
each will mean and how each will apply going forward, they do showcase 
marriage as a pressure point that presents paradoxes, raises contradictions, and 
confounds traditional distinctions. Accordingly, this Part takes a different tack, 
looking beyond Obergefell’s text to contextualize this case in a wider 
exploration of the intersection of family law and constitutional law. This 
exploration not only addresses the expected impact of constitutional law on 
family law but also considers the less expected impact of family law on 
constitutional law. For the latter, patterns emerging from the constitutional 
case law along with family law policies offer a new way to theorize 
Obergefell—in turn suggesting possibilities for future directions, with 
marriage serving as a guide. 
1. Constitutional Law’s Shaping Function 
Just as there is a conventional wisdom about liberty as a negative right, 
there is a standard story about the relationship between constitutional law and 
family law. According to this standard story, constitutional law establishes 
boundaries or outer limits for permissible family laws, which are typically, but 
of course not always, state-made laws. For example, when the Supreme Court 
holds unconstitutional state restrictions on use of and access to birth control,301 
the availability of abortion,302 or entry into marriage,303 states must follow, 
conforming their rules to the announced limits. Constitutional cases striking 
down gender-based and “illegitimacy” discrimination perform a similar 
function, disallowing certain family laws that once marked the field.304 Within 
the constitutional confines, however, states largely may govern families as 
they see fit. Because this understanding reflects the basic principle of 
                                                                                                                     
 300 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 301 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 
438, 453–55 (1972).  
 302 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 
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 304 For analysis of such equal protection cases and their impact on family law, see 
supra note 2 (citing authorities). 
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constitutional supremacy,305 it should come as no surprise notwithstanding the 
oft-invoked maxim that family law belongs to the states.306 The process works 
the same way in those instances in which Congress makes federal family law, 
as it did when enacting the Defense of Marriage Act, which the Court 
invalidated in United States v. Windsor.307 
Certainly, the process might unfold in a contentious and disorderly way, 
but the basic generalization still holds true. For example, consider Roe v. 
Wade308 and its aftermath. Once Roe struck down all abortion laws exceeding 
the limits of the trimester timetable that emerged from the Court’s application 
of strict judicial scrutiny,309 some states followed with new laws that fit the 
constitutional framework310 while others tried to weaken the announced limits 
or find untested loopholes.311 Some jurisdictions even enacted statutes directly 
challenging the constitutional limits in an effort to spur a Court with changed 
personnel to reconsider protection for abortion altogether.312 And, in fact, a 
Court majority subsequently revised the standard governing abortion laws 
when it moved from Roe’s strict scrutiny to the less demanding “undue 
burden” formulation, articulated by a plurality in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey313 and later applied by a majority in 
Gonzales v. Carhart to uphold what happened to be a federal ban on a 
particular abortion procedure.314 The Court’s latest encounter with abortion 
law only reinforces the obvious point: Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt is 
important precisely because it clarifies the undue burden standard, limiting 
states’ ability to impede access to abortion by means of onerous and medically 
unnecessary regulations of providers and clinics.315  
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428 U.S. 52, 56, 58 (1976), provides an early illustration of such efforts, with its 
requirements of, inter alia, written informed consent, spousal consent, and parental 
consent. 
 312 See, e.g., Ada v. Guam Soc’y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 1011, 
1012–13 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 313 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874–77 (1992) (plurality 
opinion). 
 314 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 147 (2007). 
 315 Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309–10 (2016); see also 
Mitch Smith & Erik Eckholm, Federal Judge Blocks Indiana Abortion Law, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 30, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/01/us/federal-judge-blocks-indiana-
abortion-law.html [https://perma.cc/4YNW-79JC] (discussing injunction against law banning 
abortion based on race, gender, or genetic anomaly in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Whole Woman’s Health). 
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Similarly, consider the Court’s shift over time on gay sex and 
relationships. Per Bowers v. Hardwick, decided in 1986, states could 
criminalize same-sex sodomy without violating the Constitution.316 States lost 
that authority in 2003, when the Court overturned Bowers in Lawrence v. 
Texas, determining that such criminal prohibitions infringe the liberty 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and thus disabling states from making 
or enforcing such laws.317 In Windsor, the Court held unconstitutional 
Congress’s exclusion of same-sex couples, who were married under state law, 
from all federal marital benefits.318 Of course, Obergefell operates in a parallel 
fashion, disallowing states from rejecting same-sex couples from their official 
marriage regime.319 Across these cases, the Constitution (as interpreted by the 
Court) defines the parameters of permissible family laws. 
This generalization leaves ample room for state family laws to influence 
constitutional interpretation. States may permit abortions beyond constitutional 
protection or recognize relationships beyond those constitutionally required, in 
time prompting the Court to revise earlier decisions. No doubt, the 
“‘laboratory’ of the States”320 allowed important state-level experimentation 
with marriage equality before the Supreme Court was ready to depart from its 
cursory conclusion in 1972 to the effect that the denial of marriage licenses to 
same-sex couples presented no constitutional issue.321 Despite approaches that 
might percolate up from the states into the Supreme Court’s constitutional 
analysis,322 the standard story still portrays the Court’s application of the 
Constitution as the determinative exercise of authority, however. 
Writing about what she describes as the underexplored relationship 
between constitutional law and state family law,323 Anne Alstott succinctly 
captures this standard story when she observes that the state family law 
“pursues a limited mission shaped by the contours of constitutional law.”324 
According to Alstott, at the same time that negative liberty performs this 
                                                                                                                     
 316 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 317 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 318 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693–96 (2013). Because it was ruling 
on a federal statute, the Court applied the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 
while noting that that provision contains a “prohibition against denying to any person the 
equal protection of the laws.” Id. at 2695. 
 319 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015). 
 320 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
 321 Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (dismissing appeal “for want of a substantial 
federal question”), overruled by Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2584. See generally Boucai, 
supra note 17 (presenting history of Baker and other early cases). 
 322 See also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 13–15 (2004) 
(deferring to state custody law to reject father’s asserted standing), abrogated in part by 
Lexmark Int’l v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014). 
 323 See Alstott, supra note 143, at 41–42. 
 324 Id. at 25–26 (emphasis added). 
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limiting or shaping function with respect to state family law, “[c]onstitutional 
law forecloses any legal claim to positive rights—to the resources needed to 
marry, to procreate, and to grow and develop.”325 As a result, states (and 
Congress) are free, as they see fit, to offer affirmative support or not for 
familial decisions and activities. 
This summary gets it right, as far as it goes. Indeed, precisely because I 
share Alstott’s conceptualization, I have long begun my family law course 
with a study of constitutional outer limits, establishing the boundaries within 
which family law may operate.326 Only once we have recognized these outer 
limits can the class begin to explore the choices that states might make in 
regulating family life. 
Yet, the tension in Obergefell about negative versus positive liberty and 
private versus public matters has also exposed how this standard story remains 
incomplete. In emphasizing how constitutional law shapes family law, this 
standard story fails to acknowledge how family law shapes constitutional law. 
2. Family Law’s Influence on Constitutional Doctrine 
a. Family Law’s Contested Core: Maintaining Dependency as a Private 
Responsibility 
As scholars have noted when writing about particular family law topics 
and as this Article has pointed out,327 a goal of keeping dependency private 
carries much explanatory force even while evoking critical responses. For 
example, Alstott herself sees the privatization of dependency as a reflection of 
contemporary neoliberalism,328 while Laura Rosenbury describes it as the 
premier value in a hierarchy of general legal values, including equality, 
dignity, and federalism.329 Yet, I would pinpoint a more specific source for the 
privatization of dependency. I would identify this notion as the essence of 
family law—a goal that animates the field and runs through its different 
elements. This is the position taken by Martha Fineman dating back to her 
early critiques of the usual understanding and performance of family law.330 
                                                                                                                     
 325 Id. at 36. 
 326 All six editions of the family law casebook that I co-author begin with a chapter on 
the constitutional parameters of family law. See, e.g., D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN 
FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1–114 (1998); D. 
KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 1–103 (6th ed. 2016). 
 327 See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text. 
 328 See Alstott, supra note 143, at 36. 
 329 Rosenbury, supra note 74, at 1860. 
 330 See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, 
AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 8–9, 227–28 (1995); see also FINEMAN, 
supra note 56, at 228 (“It is the family, not the state or the market, that assumes 
responsibility for both the inevitable dependent—the child or other biologically or 
developmentally dependent person—and the derivative dependent—the caretaker. The 
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Put differently, the privatization of dependency stands out as a guiding 
principle of family law even if this principle also coincides with neoliberalism 
(per Alstott) and sometimes interacts with principles from other legal domains 
(per Rosenbury). 
Many facets of family law exemplify this principle. Today’s aggressive 
child support policies and enforcement tools provide especially telling 
illustrations.331 The larger picture, however, also includes, inter alia, the 
public benefits that incentivize (or “channel”) pairs to marry,332 the legal 
recognition accorded to the family unit,333 the shield of privacy or autonomy 
that encapsulates it,334 the refusal to accord economic value to domestic 
labor,335 and the exclusion from the fold of those who provide caregiving 
services for compensation.336  
Among the various family law measures and constructs, marriage emerges 
as an ideal vehicle for operationalizing the principle that the needs of 
dependents must be met through private sources of support. In binding men to 
                                                                                                                     
institution of the family operates structurally and ideologically to free markets from 
considering or accommodating dependency.”).  
 331 See, e.g., Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 443 (2011) (acknowledging “a highly 
complex system designed to assure a noncustodial parent’s regular payment of funds 
typically necessary for the support of his children”); State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 214 
(Wis. 2001) (upholding, as a condition of probation, a requirement that the defendant can 
have no more children unless he shows that he can support all his children). See generally 
CHILD SUPPORT: THE NEXT FRONTIER (J. Thomas Oldham & Marygold S. Melli eds., 
2000); FATHERS UNDER FIRE: THE REVOLUTION IN CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT (Irwin 
Garfinkel et al. eds., 1998). 
 332 See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text. 
 333 We can see the idea of the family unit in both the doctrine of coverture and the 
treatment of children, in addition to wives, as the property of the husband-father. See, e.g, 
STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY: HOW LOVE CONQUERED MARRIAGE 186 
(2006); MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS: THE 
HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN AMERICA, at xii (1994). Ongoing debates about “what is a 
family?” reveal the contemporary relevance of recognition as a family unit. See, e.g., 
Martha Minow, Redefining Families: Who’s In and Who’s Out?, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 269, 
283 (1991). 
 334 See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (recognizing “the 
private realm of family life which the state cannot enter”); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 
602 (1979) (“Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of 
the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children.”). 
 335 See, e.g., Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 
91 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 3–6 (1996). This principle certainly holds true while the family unit 
remains intact. Upon dissolution of marriage, however, courts recognize at least some of 
the value of domestic services. See GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 240, at 196–200. 
 336 See, e.g., Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Money, Caregiving, and Kinship: Should Paid 
Caregivers Be Allowed to Obtain De Facto Parental Status?, 74 MO. L. REV. 25, 28–29 
(2009). 
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their wives and their wives’ children,337 traditional marriage creates legal 
obligations designed to address what Fineman calls inevitable dependency and 
derivative dependency.338 As the court of appeals explained in the case that 
became Obergefell, “[G]overnments got into the business of defining 
marriage, and remain in the business of defining marriage, not to regulate love 
but to regulate sex, most especially the intended and unintended effects of 
male-female intercourse.”339 Even marriage for same-sex couples can perform 
similar functions despite the absence of “accidental procreation” and 
diminished gender norms.340 Indeed, the couples depicted in Obergefell 
exemplify the private caregiving and support expected in marriage.341 
Against this background, the challenge that Obergefell poses for the 
conventional wisdom of negative liberty takes on new meaning. True, limiting 
liberty to exclusively negative rights advances the core policy of privatizing 
dependency, relieving the state from the cost of any constitutional “welfare 
right”—whether in the form of health care, subsistence, or protection from 
violence. Nonetheless, making an exception to this general rule for the “public 
institution” of marriage goes even further in promoting such objectives by 
firmly locating legal obligations for care and support outside the 
government.342 
Extending many of marriage’s material benefits to same-sex couples 
imposes no direct cost on the government, for example, the spousal share of an 
intestate’s estate, which would otherwise go to listed relatives,343 or 
                                                                                                                     
 337 The traditional marital presumption, or presumption of legitimacy, performed this 
function of connecting mothers’ husbands to mothers’ children. See, e.g., Michael H. v. 
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124–25 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 338 For definitions of these terms, see FINEMAN, supra note 56, at 34–37. 
 339 DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 404 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015). Of course, traditional marriage was inseparable 
from gender. See NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE 
NATION 3 (2000) (describing marriage as “the vehicle through which the apparatus of state 
can shape the gender order”); see also id. (“The whole system of attribution and meaning 
that we call gender relies on and to a great extent derives from the structuring provided by 
marriage.”). 
 340 See, e.g., Douglas NeJaime, Windsor’s Right to Marry, 123 YALE L.J. F. 219, 228 
(2013); Rosenbury, supra note 74, at 1868–69; cf. Kerry Abrams & Peter Brooks, 
Marriage as a Message: Same-Sex Couples and the Rhetoric of Accidental Procreation, 21 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 20–21 (2009) (summarizing argument). 
 341 See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text. 
 342 Alstott refers to state family law as “subconstitutional” law, asserts that 
constitutional law shapes it, and describes its content as follows: “State family law 
nominally prescribes the duties associated with marriage, divorce, and parenthood. But a 
closer look reveals that the law privileges private ordering and deploys state power only to 
resolve private disputes.” Alstott, supra note 143, at 32–33; see also Anne L. Alstott, 
Private Tragedies? Family Law as Social Insurance, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 3, 4 (2010) 
(“[F]amily law rules that establish financial relationships and liability between individuals 
constitute a form of social insurance . . . .”). 
 343 See, e.g., Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 883–84 (Vt. 1999).  
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designation as a surviving spouse on a death certificate, as sought by James 
Obergefell.344 By contrast, others come at a cost, including the federal estate 
tax exemption for surviving spouses won by Edie Windsor.345 Collectively, 
such material marital benefits, offered at the government’s option, played a 
key role in the developing legal recognition of the unfairness of barring same-
sex couples from marrying.346 The channeling theory conceptualizes them all 
as incentives to marry,347 while the goal of keeping dependency private helps 
to explain why government would elect to provide such rewards. 
b. An Expanded Shaping Story: All in the Family 
Viewed through this lens, Obergefell offers a new story about the 
relationship between constitutional law and family law. It complements the 
standard shaping story with its mirror image. Under this mirror-image story, 
family law’s aim to keep dependency private shapes constitutional law—
producing a regime that mostly consists of what the conventional wisdom 
would call negative liberty but that also includes marriage, despite 
characteristics that lead the Obergefell dissenters and others (including 
possibly the majority) to see it as a positive right. Earlier “right to marry” 
cases strengthen this argument, and so does the “right to divorce” recognized 
in Boddie v. Connecticut,348 because the financial responsibilities assigned by 
the state upon dissolution are even more readily enforceable than those arising 
within an intact union.349 
The development of the constitutional doctrine is consistent with this new 
account. As I have noted, at one time case outcomes indicated movement 
toward recognition of a right to minimum welfare even when affirmative 
government support would be necessary to realize this right. Cases about 
abortion funding and intimate violence brought such movement to a full 
stop.350 The welfare-rights thesis thus gave way to a modern conventional 
wisdom limiting constitutionally protected liberty to private, negative 
rights,351 notwithstanding marriage cases which, like Obergefell, defy this 
                                                                                                                     
 344 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594–95. 
 345 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683 (2013). 
 346 See supra note 70 (citing authorities). 
 347 See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text. 
 348 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971); see also supra notes 136–37 and 
accompanying text. This rationale for Boddie differs from that of Kenneth Karst, who 
explains the constitutionalization of divorce in that case as serving the right to remarry and 
thus intimate association more generally. Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate 
Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 671 (1980). 
 349 The classic case demonstrating that marital duties cannot be enforced while the 
union remains intact but only upon separation or divorce is McGuire v. McGuire, 59 
N.W.2d 336, 342 (Neb. 1953). 
 350 See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 351 See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text. 
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generalization. But this very defiance helps reveal new patterns in case 
outcomes.352 
Abortion funding and intimate violence share a common feature. Both 
belong in the domain of family law. As a result, the judicial repudiations of 
government responsibilities in both contexts embody—and thus 
constitutionalize—family law’s core policy of privatizing dependency. The 
abortion-funding cases make reproductive choice a private matter of “personal 
responsibility,”353 while also validating the expenditure of government 
resources to influence intimate choices—here childbirth instead of abortion.354  
DeShaney and other cases that reject any state obligation to protect against 
intra-family deprivations of life and liberty also maintain dependency as a 
private problem. As Linda Greenhouse wrote in a poignant column marking 
Joshua DeShaney’s death in 2015, “Chief Justice Rehnquist couldn’t get past 
the fact that the actual injuries were inflicted not by government agents but by 
a private person.”355 I would add that the actor was not just any “private 
person,” but a private person in the private family (a parent). The Court saw 
the custodial relationship exercised by Joshua’s father as a “natural” and 
private situation that the state did not create and thus had no duty to prevent or 
remedy. 
Drawing on these precedents, we might conclude that, upon confronting 
issues clearly situated in family law, the Court definitively resolved the 
previously open question—based on conflicting signals extracted from 
precedents356—whether the Constitution protects a right to minimum welfare. 
The Court rejected the welfare-rights thesis.357 Perhaps the understanding of 
family as a site of privatized dependency proved so powerful that it stifled 
alternative conceptualizations, or perhaps the Court simply refused to 
challenge a fundamental tenet of family law. In turn, the rejection of the 
                                                                                                                     
 352 See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 353 This is a term used in federal statutes pertaining to child support and 
comprehensive sex education. For example, the 1996 welfare reform measures, which 
emphasized child support, were enacted in the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). One type of sex education qualifying for 
federal funding is called “personal responsibility education.” 42 U.S.C. § 713 (2012). The 
term reflects a broader ideology, however, communicating that sex and its consequences 
create private obligations. I have argued that this ideology accounts for some of the 
resistance against the mandate under the Affordable Care Act requiring employers to cover, 
through their health insurance plans, their employees’ prescription contraceptives without 
cost to the latter. See Appleton, Forgotten Family Law, supra note 2, at 49–51. 
 354 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314–15 (1980). 
 355 Greenhouse, supra note 125. 
 356 See supra notes 84–89 and accompanying text. 
 357 See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202–03 
(1989); Harris, 448 U.S. at 316–18, 324; Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474–77 (1977). 
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welfare-rights thesis cemented a more general conventional wisdom of the 
“negative Constitution.”358  
A more extensive review of the case law fleshes out this story. Although I 
have emphasized precedents about abortion funding and family violence 
because they offer the most explicit rejections of positive constitutional rights 
and because their place in family law seems obvious, other decisions 
supporting the conventional wisdom also turn out to concern family matters. 
Put differently, if we search for discernable patterns based on situational 
factors (rather than legal doctrine), as legal realists did,359 we can see that the 
most pertinent constitutional cases limiting liberty to negative rights are family 
law cases, too, even if they might belong in other fields as well.  
First, consider Dandridge v. Williams, decided in 1970.360 The Court 
rejected an equal protection challenge to a Maryland regulation that capped 
welfare benefits at $250 or $240 per month, regardless of family size, thus 
affording each member of a large needy family less assistance than that 
received by members of smaller needy families.361 The State successfully 
argued the regulation encouraged employment outside the home.362 The case 
easily fits within family law because it raises questions of family size and what 
we now call “work-family conflicts,”363 which are closely related to the 
reproductive and childrearing choices implicated in iconic family liberty 
cases.364 Consistent with keeping dependency private, the Court leaves large 
families on their own to find a way to support adequately all their members.365 
Second, consider James v. Valtierra, decided in 1971,366 in which the 
Court rejected an equal protection challenge to a California law subjecting the 
development of low-rent housing projects to the will of the voters. Justice 
Marshall, joined by two other dissenters, highlighted the law’s discrimination 
against the poor, given that the referendum requirement did not apply to 
                                                                                                                     
 358 See Bandes, supra note 55, at 2272–73. 
 359 See Leiter, supra note 97, at 281.  
 360 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). 
 361 Id. at 486–87. 
 362 See Alstott, supra note 143, at 28–29. 
 363 See generally JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY 
MEN AND CLASS MATTER (2010) (using both gender and class to examine American work-
family conflicts). 
 364 See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. 
 365 This case and its rationale provided support years later for “family caps” imposed 
by some states pursuant to federal welfare reform in 1996. Family caps provide no 
additional funds upon the birth of a new child to a family already receiving temporary 
assistance. See C.K. v. N.J. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 92 F.3d 171, 194–95 (3d Cir. 
1996); Sojourner A. v. N.J. Dep’t of Human Servs., 828 A.2d 306, 317 (N.J. 2003). See 
generally DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE 
MEANING OF LIBERTY 202–45 (1997); Susan Frelich Appleton, When Welfare Reforms 
Promote Abortion: “Personal Responsibility,” “Family Values,” and the Right to Choose, 
85 GEO. L.J. 155, 160–62 (1996). 
 366 James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 142–43 (1971). 
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“[p]ublicly assisted housing developments designed to accommodate the aged, 
veterans, state employees, persons of moderate income, or any class of citizens 
other than the poor.”367 Housing and shelter are typical concerns of family 
law, as we can see in the field’s predecessor, the “law of domestic 
relations,”368 in family law’s continuing consideration of homemaking and 
domestic services,369 and even in its treatment of the “family home” upon 
dissolution of marriage.370 
Third, we have San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 
decided in 1973.371 The Court declined to rule that Texas’s school financing 
system, which rests on property taxes in each district, violates equal protection 
despite the lesser educational opportunities it provides to children living in 
poor districts compared to their counterparts in more affluent districts.372 
Without deciding whether an absolute denial of education would violate the 
Constitution,373 the Court found the Texas system rational, given the 
minimally adequate education afforded to each child and the merits of local 
control.374  
However tempted we might feel to consider public education a 
quintessentially state function, it maintains strong links to family law. Like 
families, schools help develop the next generation of citizens.375 Several cases 
about the “negative right” of parental autonomy focus on schooling choices 
and regularly appear in family law casebooks.376 More significantly, public 
schooling represents the default position for parents who do not exercise the 
option of private education or home schooling, which every state permits.377 
As such, despite compulsory schooling laws, public education might be seen 
as a delegation of responsibilities that parents, at least in theory, could exercise 
themselves. For all these reasons, Rodriguez lies at least within the 
“penumbras”378 of family law even if not at its center. And, thus, by leaving 
                                                                                                                     
 367 Id. at 144 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 368 See Susan Frelich Appleton, Leaving Home? Domicile, Family, and Gender, 47 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1453, 1464–69 (2014). 
 369 See, e.g., Mary Ziegler, An Incomplete Revolution: Feminists and the Legacy of 
Marital-Property Reform, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 259, 262–64 (2013). 
 370 E.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3802 (West 2004). 
 371 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 372 Id. at 23–25. 
 373 See id. at 36–37. 
 374 See id. at 24–25. 
 375 E.g., Anne C. Dailey, Developing Citizens, 91 IOWA L. REV. 431, 452 (2006). 
 376 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U.S. 205, 213–14 (1972).  
 377 For a survey of the minimal state regulation of home schooling, see generally 
Carmen Green, Note, Educational Empowerment: A Child’s Right to Attend Public School, 
103 GEO. L.J. 1089 (2015). See also Kimberly A. Yuracko, Education off the Grid: 
Constitutional Constraints on Homeschooling, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 123 (2008) (examining 
the constitutional implications of states’ failure to regulate homeschooling). 
 378 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
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families in poor districts without constitutional recourse in their quest for 
equal educational opportunities, the case provides additional evidence that the 
Court proved particularly resistant to the welfare-rights thesis when 
confronting family matters.379 
Lyng v. Castillo, decided in 1986, is a fourth case that fits the pattern.380 
The Court upheld, against constitutional challenge, changes to the food stamp 
program that treated parents, children, and siblings living together as a single 
household and thus disadvantaged them in the receipt of benefits, in 
comparison to groups of unrelated persons and more distant relatives.381 
Espousing a notion of negative liberty in its equal protection analysis, the 
majority saw no interference with family autonomy: “The ‘household’ 
definition does not order or prevent any group of persons from dining 
together.”382 Thus, applying the rational-basis test, the majority turned to 
“natural” family behavior: “Congress could reasonably determine that close 
relatives sharing a home—almost by definition—tend to purchase and prepare 
meals together while distant relatives and unrelated individuals might not be 
so inclined.”383 In other words, Congress and the Court assumed that 
coresident family members care for one another by sharing meals and thus 
need less government support than unrelated persons living together. These 
assumptions initiate a circular process by incentivizing the very family care 
that the law assumes. 
In contrast to the Lyng majority, Justice Marshall’s dissent saw the 
different rules for close relatives versus others in the distribution of benefits 
necessary for survival as an intrusion into family privacy because of its 
impact: “The importance of that benefit belies any suggestion that the 
Government is not directly and substantially influencing the living 
arrangements of families whose resources are so low that they must rely on 
their relatives for shelter.”384  
Jill Hasday discusses Lyng as one of several welfare cases constituting 
“family law for the poor.”385 She argues that the “family law canon” 
unjustifiably omits these cases386 and, regarding Lyng in particular, she 
exposes the “middle-class norms of family life” assumed by the statute and the 
                                                                                                                     
 379 Yoshino invokes Rodriguez as an example of the limitation of liberty to negative 
rights, but he does not mention any connection to family law. Yoshino, supra note 40, at 
160. 
 380 Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986). 
 381 Id. at 638–39. 
 382 Id. at 638. 
 383 Id. at 642. 
 384 Id. at 645 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 385 HASDAY, supra note 12, at 195, 198, 203–05. Hasday also includes in this category 
the following cases: Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Wyman v. James, 400 
U.S. 309 (1971); and Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987). See HASDAY, supra note 12, 
at 197–208. I have already discussed Dandridge in supra notes 360–65 and accompanying 
text, and the other two cases could be invoked to support my analysis as well.  
 386 HASDAY, supra note 12, at 196. 
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majority opinion upholding it.387 I accept Hasday’s contentions, but I make a 
different point. Indeed, I include these cases in my conception of family law, 
and I appreciate how they show the tenuous and conditional nature of family 
privacy for poor (or “public”) families, as other scholars have noted.388 More 
significantly, however, I simultaneously emphasize these cases are part of 
constitutional law, too. As such, they help demonstrate how family law values, 
norms, and principles have contributed to that field—in particular the modern 
understanding of the “negative Constitution.”389  
Lest one think that all of these cases eschewing positive rights are 
“poverty cases” or exclusively “family law for the poor,”390 consider as a fifth 
illustration Washington v. Glucksberg391 and Vacco v. Quill.392 In this pair of 
cases, decided in 1997, the Court refused to interpret constitutional liberty to 
include legal access to physician-assisted suicide,393 notwithstanding a 
constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment, 
nutrition, and hydration that the Court at least assumed existed a few years 
before in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.394 Although the 
Court recognized the commonalities between autonomy in the dying process 
and life-altering family decisions like the choice to have an abortion,395 the 
distinction between letting die and assisting suicide—or negative and positive 
liberty—proved decisive, as Glucksberg suggests396 and Quill expressly 
elaborates.397 Despite the absence of claims for government financial support 
for assisted suicide, the Court recalled traditional negative/positive rights 
binary in distinguishing “the freedom from being forced to stay alive . . . from 
the freedom to choose death.”398  
Reminiscent of the abortion-funding cases,399 these cases portray illness as 
a “natural” situation that the state did not create and thus has no constitutional 
obligation to address. And they are cases that often involve heart-wrenching 
family dramas requiring excruciating decisions with an impact on all family 
                                                                                                                     
 387 Id. at 203. 
 388 See e.g., Bridges, supra note 52, at 116–17. 
 389 See Bandes, supra note 55, at 2272–73. 
 390 See supra note 385 and accompanying text. 
 391 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 392 Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). 
 393 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 705–06; Quill, 521 U.S. at 796–97. 
 394 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990). 
 395 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 726–28. 
 396 Yoshino invokes Glucksberg as a precedent eschewing constitutional protection of 
positive rights that Obergefell could challenge. Yoshino, supra note 40, at 159, 168. 
 397 The Court rejected the argument that allowing patients to refuse treatment, thereby 
causing death, and prohibiting assisted suicide violates equal protection. Quill, 521 U.S. at 
807–08. 
 398 See Yoshino, supra note 40, at 159. 
 399 See supra notes 100–20 and accompanying text. 
2016] OBERGEFELL’S LIBERTIES 975 
members, as Cruzan so poignantly illustrates.400 Glucksberg and Quill thus 
easily fit within a larger framework that leaves families and their members 
constitutionally on their own to solve their personal problems, from financial 
difficulties to health crises. 
Finally, consider DeShaney’s sequel some fifteen years later, Town of 
Castle Rock v. Gonzales, decided in 2005.401 Castle Rock refused to recognize 
any constitutional duty to enforce a mandatory restraining order issued against 
a violent husband-father, who murdered his children and killed himself while 
local officials and police did nothing to respond to the wife-mother’s pleas for 
help.402 Citing DeShaney403 and using language reminiscent of the abortion-
funding cases, the majority concluded that even a mandatory restraining order 
confers no “entitlement” to state action.404 Certainly, Castle Rock is a family 
law case. And like Glucksberg and Quill, the issues raised by DeShaney and 
Castle Rock have relevance to a broad range of families, not just those fighting 
poverty.405 
Should we dismiss as mere coincidence that such constitutional decisions 
happen to be “all in the family?”406 I think not. Nor should we read these cases 
                                                                                                                     
 400 Nancy Cruzan’s parents challenged Missouri’s refusal to let them withdraw 
nutrition and hydration from their daughter whose injuries in an auto accident had left her 
in a persistent vegetative state. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 265–67 
(1990). The legal battle to honor what Nancy’s parents believed were her wishes took its 
toll, with her father subsequently committing suicide. See William Robbins, Parents Fight 
for Right to Let a Daughter Die, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/19 
89/11/27/us/parents-fight-for-right-to-let-a-daughter-die.html [https://perma.cc/62E5-
887X]; see also Eric Pace, Lester Cruzan Is Dead at 62; Fought to Let His Daughter Die, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/08/19/us/lester-cruzan-is-
dead-at-62-fought-to-let-his-daughter-die.html [https://perma.cc/PR9Y-E45T]. Physicians 
(among others) challenged the law in Glucksberg and Quill. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 707–
08; Quill, 521 U.S. at 797. 
 401 Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005). 
 402 Id. at 750–54, 768. 
 403 Id. at 755, 768–69. 
 404 Id. at 763–66. The Court repeatedly uses the term “entitlement” in explaining what 
the Constitution does not give Gonzales and her children. See generally id.  
 405 Although domestic violence occurs among all socioeconomic classes, various 
factors make some families more susceptible than others. See HILLARY POTTER, BATTLE 
CRIES: BLACK WOMEN AND INTIMATE PARTNER ABUSE 8 (2008) (citing “multiple 
marginalization factors”). 
 406 In arguing for an affirmative “right to law” (tort law, in particular), John Goldberg 
writes: 
Apart from DeShaney, the decisions most often taken to establish the no-
affirmative-rights principle are those declining to recognize a fundamental right to the 
provision by government of housing, education, and welfare payments. But to cite 
them for a general principle is to avoid asking whether there is something special 
about the rights claimed in those cases that distinguishes them from other kinds of 
affirmative rights. 
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exclusively as exemplars of constitutional doctrine writ large, disconnected 
from family law. Rather, one can see the family-law setting as integral to the 
present-day articulation of both the “negative Constitution”407 and the 
negative/positive rights distinction undergirding it. From this perspective, 
assumptions about duties within the private family, including personal 
responsibility for sex and its consequences and the dependency of family 
members, helped produce the outcomes and rationales in these cases. Put more 
modestly, the ambiguity that had allowed some theorists to infer a 
constitutional right to minimum welfare ultimately got fought out and rejected 
in the family law arena.408 Indeed, the family law arena might well have 
provided an especially apt setting for addressing such uncertainty, given the 
series of “negative rights” recognized there, including protection of 
contraception, abortion, and childrearing.409 
According to this story, family law policy has helped shape our 
contemporary understanding of a generalized constitutional principle and a 
“conventional wisdom.”410 Such policy also provides an explanation for the 
blatant exceptions to the general principle: the marriage and divorce cases. 
Despite all the family law precedents I have listed, the Court has protected 
(indeed, often expanded) access to marriage and, to a lesser degree, divorce—
notwithstanding the essential and active role of the state in these “public 
institution[s].”411 Because marriage and divorce advance the project of 
privatized dependency, Obergefell and its predecessors offer additional 
evidence of family law’s influence on modern constitutional law.412 Indeed, 
                                                                                                                     
John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a 
Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 593 (2005) (footnotes omitted). 
Although Goldberg then proceeds to make his case for “structural due process” rights, id. 
at 594, I would answer his “something special” query by noting the family-law context of 
the decisions in question. 
 407 See Bandes, supra note 55, at 2272–73. 
 408 See supra notes 84–129 and accompanying text. 
 409 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 
510, 534–35 (1925); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965); Eisenstadt v. 
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453–55 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–54 (1973).  
 410 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 411 See supra notes 130–37 and accompanying text. 
 412 I do not advance here a parallel hypothesis with respect to equal protection cases. 
Despite the fact that official gender-based roles long marked family law, constitutional 
rulings invalidating reliance on stereotyping reformed the field. See supra note 2 (citing 
authorities). Here, I do not discern patterns suggesting an expanded shaping story, in which 
the importance of gender discrimination in traditional family law has infiltrated and 
influenced constitutional law. Nonetheless, some vestiges of patriarchy persist, such as the 
presumption of legitimacy, see Huntington, supra note 281, at 178, while the line between 
“real differences” and stereotypes remains contested, see Nguyen v. Immigration & 
Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001). Similarly, some critics challenge as 
overstated the “progress narrative” of a gender-neutral family law, see HASDAY, supra note 
12, at 97–132, and others lament the missed opportunity to decide Obergefell as a gender-
discrimination case, see generally Case, supra note 29. Despite these shortcomings, we can 
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had such marriage and divorce cases been decided exclusively under the Equal 
Protection Clause, they could have permitted total abolition of marriage as the 
equalizing remedy,413 in turn, undermining rather than supporting the 
privatization of dependency. Obergefell’s liberty rationale thwarts such 
possibilities. 
Had the Obergefell majority explicitly acknowledged and embraced such 
family law policies as part of constitutional doctrine, it could have avoided 
some of the more problematic aspects of the opinion. It could have jettisoned 
the multiple understandings of “liberty” in favor of a more focused and 
coherent analysis. It could have avoided the overbreadth of the “public liberty” 
reading,414 the paradox of “naturalizing” civil marriage,415 and perhaps even 
the confusion engendered by blending liberty and equality416 and departing 
from standard categorical analysis.417 It could have eliminated the encomia to 
marriage and resulting denigration of other family forms418 by articulating 
marriage’s instrumental value in securing private sources of support. And it 
could have answered some of the dissenters’ critiques about “swords” and 
“entitlements”419 by explaining why marriage, along with divorce, have long 
stood out as exceptions to the “negative Constitution.”420  
V. CONCLUSION 
In the wake of Obergefell, several scholars predicted retrenchment in the 
gradual embrace of “relationship pluralism” that family law had witnessed in 
recent decades.421 These scholars—and I count myself among them—read 
Obergefell’s glorification of marriage to authorize legal favoritism for 
marriage and marginalization of other family forms.422 Put differently, in 
touting so many valuable and wonderful aspects of marriage, Obergefell could 
be interpreted to invite discrimination against nonmarital relationships, 
                                                                                                                     
conclude that gender roles have proven much less tenacious than the privatization of 
dependency—or that, perhaps, eliminating gender roles actually advances the privatization 
of dependency. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Gender Neutrality, Dependency, and Family 
Law (unpublished working draft) (on file with author).  
 413 See supra notes 231–35 and accompanying text. 
 414 See supra notes 210–26 and accompanying text. 
 415 See supra notes 227–56 and accompanying text. 
 416 See supra notes 257–85 and accompanying text. 
 417 See supra notes 286–300 and accompanying text. 
 418 See supra notes 251–55 and accompanying text. 
 419 See supra notes 42, 79–80 and accompanying text. 
 420 See Bandes, supra note 55, at 2272–73. 
 421 E.g., Melissa Murray, Obergefell v. Hodges and Nonmarriage Inequality, 104 
CALIF. L. REV. 1207, 1209 (2016). Courtney Joslin has catalogued these commentaries. See 
generally Joslin, supra note 253. Scholars use the term “relationship pluralism” to refer to 
legal recognition of a variety of family forms. See, e.g., Suzanne A. Kim, Skeptical 
Marriage Equality, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 37, 56 (2011).  
 422 See Appleton, Forgotten Family Law, supra note 2, at 10, 53. 
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perhaps even opening the way for a “new ‘illegitimacy.’”423 Certainly, recent 
interpretations of Obergefell by the highest courts in Illinois and Michigan 
bear out these predictions.424 
Nonetheless, based on the analysis in this Article, I can now imagine an 
alternative scenario taking shape, perhaps all the more given the changes 
portended by the 2016 presidential election. In this reconsideration, marriage 
still looms large but perhaps merely as a template for other relationships that 
could have private support obligations attached. If family law norms and 
values continue to shape constitutional law and if affirmative recognition of 
other familial relationships, beyond marriage, would advance the project of 
keeping dependency private, new “positive rights” under the banner of 
constitutional liberty should not come as a surprise. Constitutional protection 
of the relationship between nonmarital fathers and their children,425 once 
vulnerable (or even unacknowledged) under the “old illegitimacy,”426 shows 
how such expansion can occur and how such developments can facilitate 
neoliberal objectives.427 A more recent illustration can be found in some state 
courts that have extended parental status, including support duties, to partners 
of parents in the absence of biological, marital, or adoptive ties428 and have 
recognized both the financial and constitutional considerations at work in such 
situations.429 If this trajectory continues, those who have pushed for 
                                                                                                                     
 423 Nancy Polikoff coined this term. See Nancy D. Polikoff, The New “Illegitimacy”: 
Winning Backward in the Protection of the Children of Lesbian Couples, 20 AM. U. J. 
GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 721, 722 (2012).  
 424 Blumenthal v. Brewer, No. 118781, 2016 WL 6235511, at *20 (Ill. Aug. 18, 2016) 
(declining to allow equitable remedies in postdissolution financial dispute between 
unmarried partners); Mabry v. Mabry, 882 N.W.2d 539 (Mich. 2016) (mem.) (declining to 
review denial of standing for custody by biological parent’s former unmarried partner); see 
also McGaw v. McGaw, 468 S.W.3d 435, 438 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015). But see Brooke S.B. v. 
Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488, 490 (N.Y. 2016) (holding “that where a partner shows by 
clear and convincing evidence that the parties agreed to conceive a child and to raise the 
child together, the non-biological, non-adoptive partner has standing to seek visitation and 
custody”). 
 425 See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651–52 (1972); Gomez v. Perez, 409 
U.S. 535, 538 (1973). 
 426 See generally HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY (1971). 
 427 For example, federal welfare reform, enacted in 1996, emphasized the relationship 
between unmarried fathers and their children as a means for securing child support. See 
Appleton, Illegitimacy and Sex, supra note 2, at 360–64. 
 428 E.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 669–70 (Cal. 2005) (recognizing 
mother’s former partner as the twins’ second mother so that the state could collect 
reimbursement for child support from her). 
 429 E.g., Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 498 (observing that “a non-biological, non-adoptive 
‘parent’ may be estopped from disclaiming parentage and made to pay child support in a 
filiation proceeding,” in deciding that a mother’s former partner should have standing to 
seek custody and visitation); Chatterjee v. King, 280 P.3d 283, 286, 288 (N.M. 2012) 
(recognizing adoptive mother’s former partner as the child’s second parent, based on 
“strong public policy favoring child support, which is important to both the child and the 
state” and interpreting the statute in a way that avoids equal protection concerns). For an 
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affirmative legal recognition of polygamy,430 of friendship,431 and of other 
intimate connections432 that could supply new private obligations just might 
succeed in their efforts. 
As a normative matter, these emerging possibilities could present 
unsettling choices. If neoliberalism will produce more inclusive legal notions 
of family, do we want to pursue that path? Or would we be willing to let go of 
expanding family recognition in the hopes of achieving a more generally 
“supportive state”?433 Obergefell certainly does not mark the beginning of 
conversations about these questions, nor should it signal the end. 
                                                                                                                     
argument for full constitutional protection of the liberty interests of non-biological parents, 
see NeJaime, supra note 285. 
 430 See, e.g., Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151, 1156–57 (10th Cir. 2016); Adrienne 
D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and Bargaining for Equality, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1959–62 (2010); Hong, supra note 42, at 1441–42. 
 431 See, e.g., Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 
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 432 See generally Murray, supra note 421. 
 433 I borrow this phrase from Maxine Eichner. EICHNER, supra note 50, at 53–62. 
